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AT THE HEART OF I_IEAL,fI-I CARE ITEFOI{N4: I,EADERSHIP LESSONS IIROM
PRESIDENT ORAMA
lntroductiort
On March 23,2010, historic health care insurance retornr passed in the Llnited States.
Despite the fact that the I.J.S. spends the most on health care atrd arguably exports the most
health-care related ideas and technology of auy countrf irr the r.vorld, 47 million resideuts still
Iack health insr-rrance and the U.S. remains the only incJustrializecl nation irr the world that does
not have national health insnrance (NHI) (Kaiser Family l]oundation. 20l0; Klein. 2003; L].S.
Census Bureau.2A0T. Yet, it is rnore than.just tl-re personal hcalth of residents that is suflbring.
I-lealth care expenditLrres in the Llnited States slrrpasscd $2.3 trillion in 2008. l-he
average resident spent $7,681 while health care accor-rnted fbr 16.2%, of the nation's Gross
Donrestic Product (GDP) - the higlrest olall indr-rstrializecl countrics 
(Health Affairs.2010;
Kaiser Family Foundation, ?010; LJ.S. Departnrent olHealth ancl Ilurnan Services.20l0). Total
health care expenditLlres grew at an annual rate o1-4.21 percent in 2008, er slolver rate than recent
years. yet still or,rtpaced intlation and the growth in rrational income (l(aiser Iratlily Foundation,
2010). At the same time, increases in spending continuc to outpace growth ir-r the resources
available to pay fbr it (Health Af-fairs. 2008).
During his campaign fbr president. Barack Obarla mzrde health care refbrnr a major part
of his platform. Just one year after taking otfice as the ,+4tl' l'resiclent of the L]nited States.
President Obama saw his campaign prornise come to lif'e when he signed the Patient Proteclion
und A.ff-ortlahle Cure Acl inlo law. Many presidents befbre hirn 
-representing 
parties and
positions across the political spectrum - have attempted to tackle health 
care refbrm, but f-ew
have succeeded in accomplishing such sweeping change. Like his predecessors, Obama
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cliscovered that a promise on the campaigrr trail nreans sonretliing conrpletely'difJ'erent once in
office- and he firccd the same arglrments. challenges. olrstaclcs aud dcbates of those belirrc him.
Yet. unlike his predecessors. he managed to generarte enor.rgh sr-rpport to see his vision become
reality. Afier a century of failed attempts. what was it about this timc. place or circumstance that
allowed refbrm to come to fruition?
Flealth care encompasses a broad. complicated web of political. economic and cr"rltural
ideology, values and systems that must be r"rnderstood to tn-rly appreciate the rlagnituc'le ol'the
recent passing. Regardless of political belief-. reviewing recent health care relbrrl within the
conflnes of history and the context of presidential leadership ofl-ers lcssor-rs lbr leaders.
partictrlarly those attempting to implernent change.
This stLrdy will review the history of health care refbrnr in the [Jnited Statcs b1, first
looking at relbnn eflorts under past presidential leadership. cxploring the cletjnition arrd
requirements of presidential leadership. and review,ing the cvents that tooh placc in hcalth care
refbnn since Presiclent Obarna took otflce. Next. eight lessorrs lbr leacle rs attcrtrptin-e liealth care
refbnn as created by Blumenthal and Morone (2009) are outlined to provide'n franrervork within
whicl-r to review President Obama's leadership in health care retbrrr. An in-dcpth content
analysis that inclr-rded historically-based books. peer-reviewed and empirically'-basecl.f ournals,
pnblic opinion polls and rnedia reports fiom the past year provides the opportunity' to then
identity general themes and key learning, as w'ell as additiorrerl irnplications tbr leaders.
Achieving landmark refbrm took a particular type of leadership. and insights gained tiorl
reviewing President Obama's leadership in health care refbrm will provc beneflcial fbr his
remaining time in ofIce, fbr future administrations attempting reform. or any leader striving to
create clrange.
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Literatr-rre Review
The old saying "histoly repeats itsclf"holds true in the fate of health care retbrni. The
same issues. concerns. arglulrents ancl stories have appeared and reappearred tirne atrd tinre again
throtrglrout tlte history o[-refbrm etlbrts. Political historians refbr to this as periot{it'it1t - the
cycles and eras of Anterican politics (Blun-renthal & Morone, 2009). In order to understand the
periodicity in health care. I will frrst analyze the history of health care refbrrn in the United
States. I will sumrnarize past presidential eftorts, identify the r-rnderlining issues and oLrtside
factors. highlight key'stakeholders and oLrtline suggested theories to understand how the LJ.S.
arrived at its current starte. Next, I will explore the notion of presidential leaclership. inclLrdirrg
suggested deflnitions. reqr-rirerlents and trends. Finally, I will observe Obama's health care
platfbrm and rcview tltc'events thart took place since Obama arrived in ofTlce and led to the
eventttal pirssir-rg ol'tlre l)uliutl Protection untl Af/ircluble Cure Act.
tr4''hul i.s' the Hi.rtory o/'Heulth Cure Re/brm E//brts'?
Up until the rccctrt passirrg of l"rezrlth care insurance refbrm^47 nillion people lircl<ed
healtl-r insureruce. atrd the U.S. still remains the only industrialized nation in the world u'ithout
Nfll. Many explanettiotrs. systems and theories exist which attempt to illustrate how,the Ll.S.
arrived at its current state. but it is flrst important to review previous refbnn attempts that have
been made which have shaped and deflned the industry. Given my emphasis on presidential
leadership. I will fbcus on the broad etlbrts that took place dr-rring each U.S. President's tenure
beginning with the early It)00s.
Presidentiul E.//orts
More than a century of popr-rlar efTorts to achieve national health care have taken place.
with the tlrst major push happening around the same time as the campaign fbr president in 191 2
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(Birn, Brown. Fee. & Lear.2003; Kaiscr l-'amily'I--oundation.2009). FIavin-u lost the Republican
Party nomination to incumberrt Presicient l-lowarcl Tati. Theodore Roosevelt broke fiom the party
to join the progressive rnovement ancl hccanre the party's presidential nonrinee. The Progressive
Party turned to Roosevelt "as a vehicle fbr movirrg the LI.S. toward the hoped-tbr social.justice
long ignored by conveutional politicians'' (Birn et aI..2003. para.2). They endorsed social
insurance as part of their platfbrm. of wlrich rratiorral healtlr insurance was included (Birn et al..
2003; Kaiser Family Foundation.2009). The split of voters between fati and Roosevelt
r-rltimately resulted in the election of Denrocratic nominee Woodrow Wilson, but it sparked the
Progressive and Socialist Parties to continue their etlbrts by carnpaigning at the city and state
levels. and championing issues through organizations ("Wilson- a portrait." ?001).
For exarlple. one organization that existed during Wilson's tenure was the Arnerican
Association fbr Labor Legislation (AAL-L). The organization led state-by-state campaigns fbr
workmen's compensation" and in 1915 created a model and subsequent campaigns to promote
erlployment-based sickness insurance (lJirn et al." 2003). The plan was meant to cover missed
time at work due to illness or injLrry verslrs actuerlly paying fbr the costs of care, to which the
AALL received initial supporl. They argr-red that the market '"failed to protect the health of the
worktorce and American industrial productivity was strfl-ering" (Gorsky,2070, para. 5).
However, in 1917 the country enterecl into Worlcl War I, which shified the country's fbcr,rs away
fiom such dornestic needs. At the sarrre time, war provided opponents o1'social security
insurance with ammunition in the fbrm of propaganda. Statutory sickness insurance had
originated in Germany in 1883. with the primary goal of enhancing efllciency of the workfbrce
and in part to curb socialism. Opponents, therefbre, argued that its roots stemmed fiom
communist ideology and was therefbre. un-American (Gordon,2003; Gorsky,20l0). Despite
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the best of intentions. the f-ears instilled in the Artrerican peoplc silerrced the conversation and
hope fbr refbrm at any level was lost for sonre tinte.
Con-rpr-rlsory health insurance disclrssions did not rcsr"rrfhce again r-rntil the rlicldle of the
1930s. when President Franklin D. Roosevelt led the courrtry through The Great Depression. He
created the Comrlittee on Economic Secr-rrity to address olcJ age irnd unemployment issues, as
well as medical care and insurance (Kaiser Farnily FoLrnclation.200c)). IIe initially backed
rrational health insurance as part of The.rVgrr Deul proposals but there was once again strong
opposition. Organized medicine and its allies includin-u business. labor and insurance groLlps
opposed such an inclusion and invariably Lrsed their resoLlrces to lobby against it (Birn et al..
2003), Opponents believed tl-rat under an N[]l rnodel "plrvsicians wolrld lose their autonomy,be
reqr-rired to work in group practice models. or bc paid by' salary or capitatecl nrethods" (Kaiser
Family For-rndation, 7009, p. 2). ln addition. rnedical intere st groups opposing health insurance
ref-erred to it as socialized medicine. Prc'siclerrt l{ooser,elt cJic'l not want to risk the passage olthe
entire Social Security Act tr-r advance national health relirrrl and vowed to take up the health care
debate again in his next term (Gorsky.20l0). Howevcr. fbllowirrg the Social Security Act,
Congress was hesitant to undertake additional governrlerrt cxpansion. World War II began and
shified priorities, and Roosevelt passed away betbre he w'as able to see health care refbrm on the
agenda again (Kaiser Family Foundation. 2009).
Labor groups, Inedical associations and Congress cor-rtinued to debate health insurance
over the next decade. During World War II (1939-1915), employers began offering health
benefits to attract employees and with the economy on the upswing, beneflts became a chip at
the bargaining table to be negotiated between employers and r-rnions (Smith, 1993). Just nine
months into his tbufih term, President Roosevelt passed away and Harry S.Truman suddenly
Olrarna's Ilcalth Citrc ltclirrrl (r
tbtrnd himsell'at the helnr. which he rrerintained fl'orl 1945-1t)53 (Blttmerrthal & Morone.2009:
Wlritehouse.gov. 2010). Followin-{ Roosevelt's lead and as perrt ot'his Frrir Daul agetrclit.
President 'fruntan asked Congress to pass a national health progranr consisting of flve rcfbnls.
"hospital construction. expanded maternal and child health services. a broad program olrnedicarl
education and research, national health insurance (presented sirnply as "prepayment of r-nedical
costs") and disability insurance to protect workers fiom sickness and injury" (Blun"renthal &
Morone" 2009. p. 70).
Once again. opposition prevailed. Organizations such as the American Medical
Association (AMA). the voice of physicians, instilled f-ear in citizens that refbrm would create
socializc'd medicine. additional governmental control and reiterated that the concept of national
health insurancc stemnled fl'orn commllnist roots. Trttman's efforts were undercut as the
ltepLrblicaus took over Congress. and he was not able to break thror-rgh the f-ear. politics and
bLrre'etrcracy that hacl previously l-rar-rnted refbrm ef1brts. War" unemployment and segt'egatiort
took priority or,'er pr-rrsr"ring corlpulsory health instrrance as issues had so oftcn in tl"re past (Kaiser
Fanrily' For-rndation. 2009).
President Dwight E,isenhowercame to oftlce in 1953. "lke". as he was afl-ectionately'
callec{. believed that private mechanisms cor-rld solve the public's health problerns and in 1955 he
sent a special message to Congress that encollraged them to consider that "good health is a
proper national concern" (Eisenhower, 1955, para.l). "The E,isenhower health policy wor-tld keep
groping fbr ways to strengthen private health insurance and bolster local efTbrts to improve
access to health care- always with a wary eye on the budget" (Blutnenthal & Morone. 2009, p.
109). He proposed establishing "reinsurance" in which the government would rely on private
carriers to improve and expand coverage. In addition, his plan called for building and expanding
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health tacilities. addressing the shorta-u:e of'health care personncl. irnproving pLrblic health
programsand regulation. caring torthe nrentally ill. prevention, diergnosis ernd treatruent ol'
delinquent youth. and increarsing presence withirr the international cornltlunity. specifically the
World Health Organization (Dr.r'ight D. Eisenhower Foundation. 2000: Eisenhower. 1955).
With no public optior-r arvailable. the private health sector continued to grow. At the same
time, tl-re private sector began placing more stipulations and regulations on health care. As a
result, groltps sltch as the clderly ancl poor fbund it harder and harder to af1brd qr-rality care. The
elderly, employers. unions and Congress alike recognized the need to care fbr the elclerly and the
initial Medicare prograrr was born. John F. Kennedy enclorsed the proposal on the camparign
trail and Llpon taking otflcc in 1961. Once zrgain providers. insurers. business and political
grolrps adanrantly opposed the bill and Medicare proposed by President Kenned,y during his
tenttre was blockecl. I'ollowing Kennedy's assassination in I963. Vice Presidcnt .lohnson toclk
over and, afier his larrdslide victory in 1961. nrade Medicare his top priority. Medicare ancl tlie
sr:bseqttent Medicaid prograllls rnacle it through Congress in March 1965" sen,ing the elder"ll' and
poor popr"rlations (Birn. et al 2003:Gorsky.2010).
The 1970s experiettced a growing economy but inflertion and health care costs were on
the rise. Health care insnrance remained zrhot topic in the wake of civil rights and labor
Irlovements of the 1970s. Numerous bills and legislation were introduced. with contpeting
legislation fiom each party such as President Nixon with ltis Comltrehen.sit,e I{eulth lnstu"urtc'c
Plan (CHIP) and Senator Ted Kennedy who introduced the Heulth Security Act (Kaiser Farnily
For-rndation, 2009). President Nixon "was the first Republican president to accept the prerrrise
the all Americans should have health insurance..." (Blumenthal & Morone, 2009, p. 17). He
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proposed national health insurnncc cr.rnstructed around errplol,ers. with government trlling in the
gaps.
1974 is noted as a year that refbnr carnc close til becomin-{ reality, as refbrm efforts
receivecl bi-partisan sllpport fiorl politiciarns arncl the political environment was such that special
interests on all sides did not want to be seen blockirrg the progr"ess. However, national and
Congressior-ral politics experienced an irlr-nediate shifi when the Wartergate scandal broke. Irlone
of the proposed prograrns sLlcceeded and support in general began to waver (Birn et al.,2003;
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009). Hor.vever. it laid the fl'aurework 1br firture presidents and
administrations, as nrany have been known to use variations of Nixon's plan in refbrrn ef1brts 
-
including President Obama (Blr-rmentharl & Morone. 2009).
President Carter camc to oflcc 1L)77 ancl aclvociited national health refbrm. His prirnary
concern was to do so by controlling heiilth carre spcncling. as he canre into oflrce fircing rising
energy costs, mountin-u inflation and sk'rrv econor-nic growth (The White House.2010). He
delivered a plan to Congress in 197()- rl,hich nffcrccl a phascd-in approach to address sr-rcl-r
f-inancial concerns (Srlith. 1993). Ilorvever. his adrnirristration Iacked legislative strength and
other dornestic issues took precedence including cliverting an energy crisis, deregulation of truck
and airline industries, and improving the environrnent. In addition, prior to President Carter
taking otflce the political process had intensifred clue to the Watergate scandal. and bills and
legislation were lbrced to go through nrore tirne-consnllin-{ layers. With additional checks and
balances in place, nothing signifrcant rvas accornplished on the health care front during Carter's
tirne in oftlce.
President Reagan entered the White House in 1981 and imrnediately implemented tax
cnts. increased military spending and slashed spending on domestic programs such as Medicaid.
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Health care refbrnr was not on the president's priority' list. but he experienced uncxpected
backlash when his administration proposed nraking clranges to Mcdicarc berrefits as part olthe
social security legislation. Medicare is said to have avoided the sanre fate due to the
nrobilization of the elderly and their allies and, in fact. thc threat o1'losirrg sr-rch an important
grolrp olsr-rpporters fbrced the adrninistration to take up the issue olcare fbr elderly in a much
greater capacity than they ever anticipatecl. That. in acldition to the lran-Contra ,.unauf .
changed the public's perception of Reagan. He began losing people's trust and ars a result
supported a large Medicare expansion for the elderly to keep thenr on his side. T'he legislation
wtls reversed in the next round of Congress and therelbre was rrot irlplernented. but health care
was heavily debated under President Reagan's watch.
President George H. W. Bush participated rliniurallf in thc debate. adcling health care tax
creclits and purchasing pools to the list of refbrm proposals. neither ol-which received nruch
support. President Bush had a light domestic zrgenda and his eflbrts were fbcused nlore on
tbreign matters such as operation Desert Storm in r,l'hich the LI.S. sent troclps to dcf-end Kuwait
against lraqi president Saddam Hussein. Health care renrained dorrnant again until the election
o1'President Bill Clinton in 1993.
President Clinton campaigned heavily on healtlr care in the 1q92 presidential election,
and it remained one of the prominent issues on his agenda once in ofhce. With a democratically
- controlled Congress and with health care already top of mind with the public fiorl the
carrrpaign trail, some kind of reform seemed prornising.
Nearly every major health care interest group had endorsed sr:bstantial retbrms--
grandiose ones, in fact. The American Medical Association (AMA) and Health lnsurance
Association of America (HIAA), the two great, l-ristoric bastions of opposition to
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compr-rlsory health insurance. both went orr record in support o1'ttn entplo,ver litiutdate and
runiversal coverage. Even the U.S. Chamber olCotrurerce cnclorsed att ertrployer
rnandate. as did many large corporations. Other groLlps crrnre out variously fbr refbrnr
options that ran along a spectrunr fronr Canadian-style. single-payer prograrns on the leli
to rlanaged competition and medical savings accounts and raclicarl changes in tar policy
on the right. Under the circumstances, it was easy to believe the country was ready fbr
substantial refbrrn and that a market-oriented, conslrrner-choice approach to universal
coverage. positioned in the center, could become a platfbr"rn fbr consensus (Starr. 2004.
para.5).
lJnder President Clinton's helm. the Heulth Securitlt 11r'1 was proposecl based on six
principles: "seclrrity. simplicity. savings, quality, choice and responsibilit,v" (Clinton" 1993. p.
17). The plan inclr"rded "universal coverage, employer and ir-rdiviclual nrandatcs. corilpetition
between private insurers. and (regulation) by governnrent to keep costs clown. LJndcr tnanaged
competition private insurers and providers wor-rld conrpete lbr the busirress r>l'groups of hLrsiness
and individuals in what were called "health purchasirrg alliances""(l(aiser [rarttil\' [joundation.
200e. p. 7)
While the plan had the best of intentions, a variety of issues challenged its fate f}om day
one. The first issue w-as the creation of the 5O0-member Task Force to Refbrrn Health Care.
which was established in.lanuary 2003 with First Lady Hillary Clinton appointed to lead the
charge. The working groups were set up to conceive and provide input on plans as part of the
task fbrce, but who actually served on the task fbrce and their respective roles remained a
mystery, as a blanket of secrecy was pr-rt over the groups frorn day one. "The emphasis on
secrecy began when the health care task force was set up in the flrst weeks of the Adrninistration.
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Congressional aicles ancl others r,vho u'orkc'd on clevelo;lin-rr the plan were told not to talk to
reporters. and the Adrnirristration tried to keep their nulrres secret" (Clymer'. 1994. para.30).
Years later. doctors and cor-rsllnrers liled a lau,slrit ergerinst the adrninistrartion to seek access tt-r
records of the task torce that developed the plan. irrclLrdirrg the nanres of those who served. Both
chief architect of the plan. lra Magaziner. a senior policy advisor to President Clintorr. and
Hillary Clinton found themselves in court over" the very issue just one year later (Pear, 1994).
It is true that nrenrbers olthe task tbrce were sworn to secrecy and asked not to speak to
the press or puhlic about their rvork. hr-rt the Adn-rinistration claiurs it was becanse "they did not
want articles appearing about thc hcalth care legislation r,vhen everybody was tocused on the
budget" (Clymer. 1994. para. 28). In addition. there is a common misconception abor"rt the role
of the Task Force in developing the proposed Wlrite IIor-rse plan. It was only set r-rp to clevelop
preliurinary options ernd infbrnration. not to concluct negotiations. In fact.
...the Irresident's Task Irorce - urr-rsisting of nrembers of the cabinet and several other
senior ofJlcials - provecl to be useless lirr leaching decisions aurd drafiing the platn. It
irnrnediately becarne thc subject ol litigation and dissolved at the end of May without
making any recorlmenclations. Bill Clinton actually never gave up control of the policy-
making process. and the work f'ell to a snrall team of advisors and analysts that (lra)
Magazirrer directed... The decisit-rn meetings abor"rt tl,e plan took place or-rtside the fbrrnal
strr-rcture of-the task fbrce. usuzrlly in tlie Itoosevelt Room of the White House. and the
president ran the meetings hirlself (Starr" 2007. para.4).
This point perhaps lends itsellto the arglunent that the plan was created behind closed
doors. However, Paul Starr (2004), a senior policy advisor who served under President Clinton,
sr.rggests that "(e)very president works up proposals "behind closed doors" betbre presenting
Augsburg College LibrarY
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them. The real problern was that tinre was spent developing a plan that should have been spent
negotiatirrg it..." (para. 11). Clertainll, the Pre"sident needed a r,r,orking groLtp to dcvelop tlre plan,
but at a tundamental level. the core olthe plan should have been developed and then the rest left
tbr negotiation with nrembers of Congress.
Additional issues cited were the ler-rgth and cornplexity of'the plan. Topping 1,400 pages.
the plan was dif flcult to explain and arguments suggest that it w.as not clearly coltlntLtnicated to
the public (J.F.L. 1994, p38a). "l'*Jo universal. cornprehensive coverage will ever be achieved in
the U.S. without an active mobilization of the popr-rlation (especially progressive fbrces) so as to
balance and neutralize the enormolls resistance tiorrr sonte of the nrost important flnancial
lobbies in the nation" (Trlavarro.2007. para. l3). Generatirrg pul-rlic support is critical. ernd
Hillary Clinton championed the plan by speaking to Congress, insurzince grolrps ar-rd the medical
plof'ession. in addition to hosting town hall fbrLrrns thror-rghout thc colrntry. 'fhe ach-ninistration
also pr-rblished a book by President Clinton entitled I{eulth .t'cc'urittt; tlrc I'r'cs'iclent's Report to the
Arnaricun peoplc " that outlined the plan. Despite her hest el'lbrts. I lillary was r-rot able to make
the plan meaningful to the majority of'the public.
Competing plans fiom both Democrarts and Republicans w'ithirr Congress were presented
which only complicated the conversation. In addition. nrid-term elections \A,ere -jr.rst around the
corner. and Republicans who initially supported refbnn eflbrts - some who had even proposed
their own plans - aligned on defbating President Clinton's ir-ritii'rtive to strengthen the Republican
Party's position. "All the elernents of the conservative coalition, from the anti-taxes to the social
conservatives,, rnobilized against the Clinton health plan and agetinst the Clintons personally,
while liberals were ambivalent and Democrats in Congress were divided. Newt Gingrich, Grover
Norquist, Bill Kristol, and other figures in the conservative movement saw health reform as an
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icleological threat beczurse ilit succeeded. it might rencw Nerv Deal beliet-s in thc elficacy'of
governnrent. whereas a clefbat o1-the health plar-r coulcl se1 libcralisnr back lbr years'f Stul',. 2007.
parar. 29).
The next issue was that Hillary Clintor-r becanre the fhcc o1-- ancl thc'Clinton narre
synonymor"rs with - health care relbrm. Criticisms ol'her involvernent began with her
appointment to the lead the Task Force, jr-rst nine days after Prcsiclent Clinton's inaugr,rration.
She greatly expanded the First Lady's role beyond that of'her preclecessors and challenged the
status qr-ro in many ways, while controversy sllrrounded some of'heractions and leadership style
(Burden & Mugahn. I 999). For example. she was acclrsed of holding se crct mectings of tl-re
-['ask Irorce behind closed doors and would not release the narres ol-aides rvorking on the plan to
the public. In addition. there was a perception that her str,'le \\'as conrbative and she was not
willing to conrplor"t"tise. believing strongly that the proposeci plarr u,as thc riglrt approach
(Clynrer. 1994). RepLrblicans began ref-erring to the plan as "l Iillarycarc . il tcrnr that has since
come to defrnc the failed atternpt at refbrm dr-rring Presiclent t'lir.ttur-r's tinre in ofllce (Navarro.
2007).
Interestingly, the First Lady was not involved in prelir"ninarv refbrm con\ersations;
President Clinton already had a fiamework in mincl when he appoirrtccl her to leacl the charge and
opposing arglrments suggest Hillary took the fall lbr her hr,rshzrncl's tailed etlbrt (Sterrr. 2007). At
the sanre tiure, the White House was willing to and did cornpronrise tiorn the begir-rning. For
example, "(w)hen he made managed competition part of his plan in the fall o1'1992, Clinton was
moving toward the center right and laying the basis fbr a firtr,rre deal with the conservative
Democrats and moderate Republicans who also backed rnanaged-cornpetition proposals" (Starr,
2007, para.27). The task fbrce reportedly met with 572 separate organizations. including
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senators. representatives nncl stafl. to -uet input ancl ideas to help shape the plan. l-he
etdrninistration then took the inpLrt arrd nrade recor-nrrrendatiorrs based on what they'belicvcd was
the best coLlrsc ol't-tction. 'I-lre irrtentiorl wrls to maintain the core of the progranr u,hile creating
the opportunity fbr layers to be peeled ofTas necessary. The overall ef1brt is said to havc been
the biggest outreach elTort ever in laying the gror-rndwork Ibr a bill (Fallows. 1995). Hou,ever.
in the end. was ther-e was no compromise on the behalf of opponents who sought only to def'eat
the Clintons. nor was there slrpport tbr any of the other proposed bills on the larble. Flillary
indicated that. "cvery time w'e uroved toward them, they would rllove away" (Fallows. 1q95"
para. 68).
After its c'lel'eat. rnembers of the adrlinistratiolr recognized that they hacl undercstimated
hor,r,ntan)'menrlrcrs of ('ongress wor"rld backpedal atier initially showing sllpport ltlr relitrrn.
werc Lrnprepal'ccl lirr the level ol'resources opponents would expend to def-eat it. ancl expressed
thert they' shoulcl have been lrore transparent with the press and public. as their unintencled
actions behind the scerres onlv f'ed the story of secrecy w'ithin the Wlrite House irnplied by
Republicans.
Neither l.he Heulth Securit),Ac'l nor any other refbrm ef'fort ever saw'thc light of day. as
rlid-terrl elections gave RepLrblicans control of both the House and Senate fbrthe flrst time in 40
years (Cly'rner.2004). "'[-he collapse of health care reform in the f-rrst two years ol'the Clinton
adn-rinistrettion will go down as one of the great lost political opportunities in Arnerican history. It
is a story of cotnpromises that never happened, of deals that were never closed, ol Republicans.
moderate l)emocrerts. and key interest grolrps that backpedaled fiom proposals they themselves
had earlier co-sponsored or endorsed. It is also a story of strategic miscalculation on the part of
the president and those olus who advised him" (Starr,2004, para. 5). However. all was not lost
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during Clintorr's tinre in olllce. During his second term in of1lce in 1997. the presiderrt" along
witlr a Repr-rblican-controlled Congress. enacted the (-/iiitlt'cn'.t'Ilculth In,t'ttrunc'e Progrunt,
whicl-r built upon the Medicaicl program to provide health care to rnore low-inconre children.
George W. Buslr served as president tr"on'r 2001-2008. He has been described as being a
hands-off president, except wlren it canre to health care. The Br-rsh administration, w'hich was
generally conservative. achieved the largest expansion in Medicare's history and the biggest
health care entitlement in fbur decades (Blumerrthal & Morone. 2009). As opposed to ltis father
who shied away fiorn donrestic issues such as health care. President George W. Bush chose to
tackle health .u... FIis initial proposal containecl three aspects: 1) n-rake health insurance
premiums paid by employers on behallol-employees firlly taxable:2) redirect ftrnds the f'ederal
government spends on health care to state govenrors to help their state residents attain health
insurance access; and 3) allou,Anrericans to cleduct money trorn taxable income (Reinhardt"
2007). While the final bill hardlv resenrbled his initial vision. Bush is credited with the passing
of the Mediccrre ll4odat'nizulion.rlc't. w'hich sought to provide seniors and individLrals with
disabilities with a prescriptiorr drug trenef rt. rrore choices, and better beneflts under Medicare
(Centers tbr Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010).
Every president has leti a nrark on healtl-r care. yet there are many grolrps, trends atnd
outside factors that greatly inflr-renced each president's point of view along the way.
Whul Othar Fuclor.t Huve Influencetl Heulth Cure Refbrm'l
There are a number of theories. trends and outside factors that have signiticantly
influenced the health care debate. In addition, key stakeholders including patients, medical
associations, insurance and pharmaceutical companies' power and inf}-rence must also be
explored.
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Th a or i c.t und 7i'e ncls'
A nurlber of theories exist that seek to explairr the current state ot'lrealth care in the LI.S.
beginning witlr path dependency,which is "the idea thzit clecisions terken early on carl
significantly constrain possibilities fbr change later irr tinre" (Ciorsky'.2010. para. 3).
Specitically related to health care, ideas fbr improving czrre or operations are nret with resistance
sirnply because of being accustomed to tl-re way things har.,e always been done (Hacker. 2009).
Consider that initial insurance and health care plzrns grew to meet the denrands of conslrrrers.
Without a public plan in place. the private sector fllled in the gaps to meet those demands. As the
private market continued to grow, it becarne increasingly dil'licult to introcluce new plans or
proposals. "'fhe cost of change grew insurnror-rntable anrJ existirrg arrangcnrenls becanre
'.locked" into place" (Peterson. 2005, p1681).
Sirrrilarly. Gordon (2003) outlines three conrmon cxplanatior-rs fbr the lack olhealth care,
which include the institutionalist, liberal or plurerlist ancl raclical vicw,s. Corclon argLres that none
of these perspectives is particularly adeqr-rate fbr explaining thc lack of health care in the U.S..
but that each has played a role in shaping refbrnr as it stands toclal'.
Path dependency most closely aligns with the irrstitr-rtionetlist point of view. which
suggests that our political system was created in such a w'a)' that makes it structurally biased
against comprehensive refbrm of any kind (Cordon. 2003). Patterns. nrles. norms. process,
bel, avior and structures exist and come to be fbllowed in er sell'-perpctuating manner. The
institution exists with the prirnary concern of maintaining strr,rcture. which is in direct opposition
to tl-re primary concern of refbnn, which is action. Refbrm puts pressure on and challenges the
pattems, rules, norms:, process, behavior and structures created by the institution and in most
cases, the institution wins simply because it is established. In the case of health care, the
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institLrtior-r irtvitecl private zrlternativcs and conservatives were alrle to usc its li'agntetrted state ancl
the political culture to fi'Lrstrate refbrm (Gordon.2003). '"I'he ke.v point is thaI tlic political
institLrtions of'thc U.S. tend to impede deep and contentious refornrs" (Gorsl<,v.2010. para. 12).
'l'he libcrarl or plLrralist perspective sr-rggests that the U.S. cloes not have health care clue to
"popular or cultural taith in private soh-rtions and a distrr"rst o1''radical' political solutions"
(Gordon.2003. p.3). These solutions stemmed fiom dernographic. econontic arrd political
demands of industrialization" and created a deep seeded belief in the "ctlicacl, oltnarket
solr,rtions to social problerns" (Gordon.2003.p.3). For instance. the idea of a public plan is one
of w,hich nrany have been adamantly opposed. "A public plan is vierved as a step too far fbr a
colrntry that has resistance to expansive government locked irr its DNIA" ("Hazards"" 200c).
para.1 1 ).
-l'he raclical view sug-{ests that the lack of Arnerican heetllh policf is a reflcctiot-t o1'class
politics ancl a w,eakness of the workingclass. Simply put, the people who necded it tlost \\ere
nut includecl in the conversation or if they were. involvetleut \,vas as a token but trot consiclcred
signilicarnt. Tliere is criticisrn that elitists and academics built plans hehincl closed doors withor-rt
public inpr"rt. ''Politics have fiustrated, rather than reflected. popular aspirettions and values"
(Gordon.2003.p. 7). HofTrnan (2003) concurs, stating "national health refbrm catnpaigns in the
10tl' centllry \\'ere initiated ancl run by elites rnore concerned with clef-ending a-gainst attacks fl'orn
interest grollps than with popular mobilization..." (para. 2).
It is difllcult to come to an agreement on the best refbrm for the country when there are
firndamc'ntal difl-erences in how people approach this issue and. more specifically. how to pay fbr
it. "The long health care debate breaks down into three eras, each with its own model of health
care rooted in a difl-erent version of politics and market...each is analytically distinctive. each
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rests on zr clifl-erent philosophl'. ancl each rellects the spirit ol'its timc. We utight sunrrlarize the
three approaches as robust govenrnrent. a rnix ol'governurent and merrket. ancl robust ntarkets"
(Blumenthal & Morotte.2009. p. 11). I-lealth care is thc sixth biggest indLrstry irr the LJ.S.
meaning it is irr"rportant to rnaintetin. br-rt who rllns it and who pays fbr it are the ditflcult
questions. Sonre believe that health care is a tr-rndarnental right of every citizen and that it is the
governntent's obligation to help provide and pay fbr health care, w'hile others believe thc
government has no hr"tsirress being involved and it is up to individuals to provide fbr therrselves.
Regardless olapproach. expanding health insurance has never tit any budget. and the ability of
the president to introduce major refbrm is nrost ofien linrited by the cost and economics
(Blumenthal & Morone. 2009).
Two additiotral trends within the recent health carre debate nray have operred the cioor firr
recent refilrm. Prentiunrs lrztve shot up. making insr-rrance increasingly rnore expensive ancl
dif1lcult fbr enrployers and individr.rals to maintain. and LJ.S. companies are increasingly
competin-e with tlrrrts in othercountries where health insurance is rarely oflltrecl. nreanirrg LI.S.
employers pay fbr benellts. while their cornpetitors do not (Appleby, 2008).
Key Stukeholtler.t'
Otrtside of presidents and policy rttakers, a number of key stakeholders have Lreerr
instrumental in shaping the health care debate such as patients. rnedical associations. insurancc
companies and pharmaceutical cornpanies. all olwhom implore lobbyists to champiorr tlreir'ow,l-r
specific goals and needs. This section introduces the stakeholders and the intlr-rence they have
had on health care refbrm.
Throughout history, lobbyists have played an integral part in shaping health care. and the
same held true in the most recent refbnn etlbrt. According to Eaten & Pell (2010):
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(M)ore than 1,750 conrpanics and organizations hired abor"rt 4.525 lobbyists - eight fbr
each nrembelof-Cong to inlluence health refbrnr trills in 2009. The list of-
companies and organizations that u,orked to put their imprint on legislatior-r is diverse.
ranging tl'om health care intelests and aclr,ocacy grollps to giant corporations. small
businesses. Arnerican lndian tribes. religioLrs groLlps. and universities. Arnong industries,
207 hospitals lined up to lobby. lbllowed by 105 insurance companies and 85
manufhcturing companics. 'l'rade. advocacy. and prol-essional organizations trr"rmped
them all with 745 registered groups that lobbied on lrealth refbrn-r bills. illustrating the
common Washington str"zrtegy ol special interests banding together to pool money and
increase their influence (para. 3-5).
In total. it is estir-nated that lo[rb1,ists spcrrt nrore tharr $1.2 billion on their eflorts. signilying the
importance and complexitl, ol' thc issuc.
Health care exists due to corlsllnre r clenrand and necd, and patients are the consllmers of
health care. Prirnary patient concerns irrclLrcle accessibility. qLrality and cost of coverage. The
biggest challenge fiom the pattient point of'view is that every individual, family or gror-rp has
ditl-erent rnedical needs and priorities. One explanation 1br stalled health care refbnn is that
there has not been one consistent voicc or advocate on behallol'all patients. Health care refbrm
lacked grass roots mobilization. which is olierr at tlre heart of refbrrn. Consider the history of
social movements in the LJ.S. - civil righls. l'errinist. elderly, disabled - each grolrp has its
own specific needs atrd dernands. and each applied a piece-rneal approach to address those needs
and demands (Hoffman.2003). As each grollp set out to see their individual needs met, the issue
became more and more segmented and set the tone fbr firture groups to fbllow suit. One
example of a group that advocates fbr individual needs is the American Association fbr Retired
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Persons (AARP). a non-govemnrental organization arrci irrterest grurlrp that exists to address the
concerns and rreeds of people overthe age of 50. AARP deploy'cd 56 in-hoLrse lobbyists and twcr
fl'onr outside flnls to work the issr-re on behall'ol'its rnemhers cluring recent refbrtn eflbrts (Eaten
& Pell. 2010).
A specific example within the medical prof-ession is the American Medical Association.
(AMA). a profbssional organization that serves as the voicc ol the physicians and residents.
With more than 230.000 members. it is the largest prof'essional orgeurization in the U.S. The
AMA believes that "the future of medicine should be decidecl by physicians - not legislators or
private interests like insr-rrance companies" (AMA-ASST!.org.2010). For-urded irr 1847. its
prinrary functions have evolved over tirne and have inclr"rclecl representing the profbssion.
providing scientiflc infbrmation to keep its merntrers infbrnrec-I. providirlg socioecononric
inlbrrlation that irlpacts the prof-ession. provicling data on thc prof-ession itself. nraintaining
eclucational standards, plus maintaining the strength ol'tlre orgar-lizattion ancl rclationships with
cit1,'. state and other special groups of interest (Canrpion. 1984).
Historically. the AMA has been one of the most vocal opponcnts o1'health care retbnn.
spending hundreds of millions of dollars to hanrmer its point of'view horne with legislators and
patients. "The influence of the American Medical Association (AMA) and others in the
Anrerican setting reflected not the natural resonance ol their rressage but the immense resollrces
that they brought to bear on American politics ar-rd public debate" (Gordon. 2003,p. 4). Primary
concerns over time have included the impact refbrm would have on private medical care, Iimits
placed on private initiatives and the freedon-rs of physicians to do theiriobs. government
involvement in the medical process, and the potential of government dictating medical decisions
that wonld impact its members (Campion. 1984; Gorsky.2010). These concerns were no
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diftercnt within reccnt rcfbrm ctlbrts. lnt the AMA rvas r,villing to worlt with the presiclent and
Iawmetkers fbr two reasor-rs. F-irst. the AM,r\ agreecl rvith the administration that continuing or1
the sanre path was Llnacceptable. AMA President J. James Rohack stated. "(w)e think cloirrg
nothing wor-rld only atccelerate the total flrealthcare] costs to Arnerica and increase the total
trunrberof uninsured. and we know already that they live sickeranddie younger if access to their
rnedical care is the enrergency room" (Lowes. ?010. para.4). While they did not a-sree witlr
everythir-rg irr the plan. the AMA pref-erred to have a seat at the table rather than he cut out ol-the
conversation completely. which some organizations experienced when opposing refbnn ("LI.S.
Doctors Divided." 2010). "-['he pending bill isn't perfbct. but we can't let the perf-ect be thc
enenry of the good" (l-owes.20l0. para2). hr 2009, the AMA employed 33 firll-tirlc lobhy'ists
and spetrt tnore than $20 rrrillion in loblrying Congress on behalf of its nrembers (lratcn & Pell.
2010)
Sinrilar to the AMA. insuratrce providers'prirlary cor-rcerns surrounding health carc
refi-rrrn have been regulation in addition to potential loss of revenlle (Gorskr,.20l0). I'he r,'crv
llrst iltsllrance plans began during the Civil War and covered the insr-rred against accidents lj'orl
travel by rail or steamboat. Massachr-rsetts Health lnsurzrnce of Boston issued the first gror,rp
policy otl-ering comprehensive coverage in 1847. and the f-rrst individual arrd illness policies
evolved around 1890 ("History of Health." 2009). During the early 1900s. thc National
Convention of Itrsurance Commissioners developed the first rnodel of state law fbr regLrlating
health insurance. In the 1930s, the nonprollt Blr-re Cross and subsequent Blr-re Shield plans began
in response to the need dr-rring the Great Depression (Corsky,2010). Providers otlbred discor.rrrts
to the plans in exchange fbr increased volurne and prompt payrnent ("History of Heerlth," 2009).
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Essentially. insur-ance ploviciers acivocate the robr"rst rlarket perspective. since it allows thenr thc
greatest control o\/er pricing arncl sen,iccs (i.e." protitability).
Since the governntent was nclt able to creatc a-rtreeable solutions in terms ol'public
options. private insurance plans grew to rreet the derr-rand. While the actr.ral number of plans
available to consumers toda;- is debatable. {,,11 ,Vslr,,r' und Wor"ld Repor'l recently reviewed 730
commercial. Medicare. and Medicaicl health plans as part of their "Best of" series. 'fhe sheer
number of available plans serves to highlight the breadth and the complexity of the issue
(Comarow, 2009). While the numt-rer of plans grew, so did the providers' ability to choose the
ideal candidates to cover. to chargc higher premiurns and to even refuse to cover (i.e.. tl-rose witJr
pre-existing conditions). Healthy nrenrbers cost less than sick members. and it has become
increasingly dif1icult fbr those rvho really need coverage to get coverage. Insurance proviclers do
not want the governtnent telling thertr u'ho they,'n-rr-rst cover or the types of coverage they rtrust
otl-er. At the same tinre. conrl-retition fbr healthy menrbers is flerce, as is w.itnessed by the
number of plans available in the rlarket.
While insttrance providers are concerned w"ith covering additional rnembers,
pharmaceutical cotnpanies are harppy r,r,'ith the addition of more insured patients. More patients
with access to health care Ireans a larger pool of people eligible fbr drugs, and pharmaceutical
companies main concerns are with profits and regr-rlaLion. Like insurance providers, they adhere
to the robust market perspective. even though their prirnary interests difl'er. In 2009, LI.S. sales of
pharmaceuticals grew 5.1 percent. reaching $300.3 billion (fMS Health,2010). It remains
number three 1n Forlttne nlagazine's top indLrstries fbr return on revenue and assets, and nurnber
tlve in retum on shareholder equity (Fortune.com, 2009). Pharmacer-rticals are a big business and
a major lobbyist, with organizations such as the Pharmaceutical Research & Manut-acturers of
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Arnerica por"rring more than $26 million in lobb-v e lhrts. ancl the overall inclustry slielling oLrt
more than $40 in the frrst three rnonths o1'200t) alone (Centcr fbr Responsive Politics.20l0:
Seabrook and Overby.20l0). The ir-rdustr1,'has used its cloLrt to nraintain a sezrt at the reibrm
table.
Health care has been on every presiclerrt's agenda lbrthe past century. regardless of
whether a president intended it to be. Key issr-tes influenccd the ability to create change.
including ideological difl-erences. the lobtrying strength o1'special interest gror-rps. domestic and
international events, and even the system itself-. -fhe acconrplishments. challenges and def-eats in
health care mirrored the sentiment of the tirnes. yet were signilicarrtly influenced by presiderrtial
leadership.
Whut is Prc.yitlcnt iul /.cudcrsltip'/
Every president comes to ofTlce with a dilfcrent arpproach. agenda antl set ol'challenges.
"But despite all the variation, we 've watcl-recl tlre nation's health citre tror-rbles climb Llp every
presiderrt's agenda. Each presiderrt had to thce up to thc issue. Ancl when he clid - whether in
good tirnes or bad... each encountered the sirnre stuhborn recluirements of presidential
leadership" (Blr-rmenthal & Morone,200t). p.410). What erre therequirenrents of presidential
leadership? How do they impact a presiclent's role and the ability to lead'? In this section, I will
explore deflnitions and challenges facin-u presidents. along w,ith a brief overview of trends
impacting presidential leadership today such as inrage creation" perception and the media.
De.fini t ions ctnd C hctllenge s
Ever since George Washington was sworn in as the first president of the Llnited States,
the role of president has continually evolved and changed with every individual who has had the
privilege of serving in the role. The role of the president as or-rtlined in the Constitution is
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extrentely vzlglre" witlr the rnajoritl, of the space dedicated to how each ltrcsiclcnt should be
elected versLrs outlining the specific goals or tasks (Watcr"ntan. Wright. & St. ('lair'" 1999).
.'Virtually every Arnerican. fiom seven to seventv. has a list olcriteria ol-what rnahes a "good"
president. Yet. when corrsultingthe r"rltirnate authority. Article IIol'the ('olrstitution. rvhich
delineates the firnctions and duties of the president, one notices hon'short. sketchy. vagr,re. and
almosttrivial the description of the of1lce appears" (Dentorr.200-5. p.26). -l-he.iobs that were
assignecl are extrenrel], broad" such as()ommunder-in-(hicf d'lhe.lrnt.t'trntlArn'l,, but little
description ot'parameters provided beyond mention. As Blunrenthal arrd Murone (2009) point
out. "there is no owner's manual fbr rr"rnning the White llouse" (p. 7).
Three governmental branches exist in tl-re Urritecl States: executir,c" lcgislative and
iudicial. The original idea was tl-rat each brtrnclr would lrarrc separiitc po\\crs vvlrile serving as a
check fbr the others to ensure balance of power. Neither Congress n()r thc president could rnake
a decision withor-rt the support or buy-in of the other. and tl-re.iLrdicial branch coulcl ovcrturn any
decisior-rs it lelt were unconstitutional or beyond the power o1'the cNecutivc ancl legislative
bratrches. While the original intention of the separatiorr ol'power was lbr tlre branches to
conrplernent one another. the lines between thern lrave becorre incr"eersirrgll' blurred and there is a
widely accepted argulrent that the branches of governrnent conrpete u,ith onc another (Mari &
McCaffiey. 2008; Neudstadt: 1 960).
While every president has lefi his tlark on the presidcncv. Wooclrorn, Wilson was the t'irst
to "break through the barriers dividing president and Congress arrd unite Lroth thror-rgh a common
policy agenda initiated by the president" (Mari & McCat'fiey. 2008. p 73 ). In an cffort to gairr
power, Wilson took his case fbr policy creation and refbrrn to the people. lJpon selling his
vision and generating public sr-rpport. he then had the nleans to go back to C'ongress to address
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what he clainred lvas the clesirc' of'the people. The president and Congrcss rvoulcl agree to arr
agenda ancl ertrrerts in the speciflc flelds wor-rld then execute the atctr-rzrl work under the
president's direction. Within todal"s political t}amework, this nriglit be ref'en'ed to as innovative
leadership. whereas a candidate or president persuades the public that tl-re visions. plans and
-toals tlrat lnake Lrp the errcl-ritectural plarrs fbr the nation are, in fact. desired by the n-rajority
(Denton.2005).
Ilavin-q a Ina-lority does not necessarily mean holding all of the power" and presidential
power is onc the great paradoxes of the oftce. The president is considered one of'the most
powerfirl people in the r,'u,orld. yet at the same time, one can only accomplish so rtruch in thc role.
As Denton (2005) explains:
The ofllce always seents too strong or too weak. A president appeerrs to herve too rnuch
po\\el' lbr the r*tiro,ion of "self'-rule" while lacking enough power to solve the nation's
tt-tttst critical problenrs. flre American pr-rblic. as the story goes. wants a contnton nran in
the White House but erpects uncofflmon leadership. The public denrands tlrat ar president
be above ""politics" while fbrgetting that to be elected ar"r individual must be. above all. a
politician. Bv acting clecisively, the president is labeled "dictatorial" and
"Llnconstitt-ttional." But by tailing to act decisively. the president is called "passive" and
",uveak". (p. 25)
Presidential power also is conditional. "Depending upon specif-rc individuals and
situations, the presiderrcy is always either too powerful or not powerful enough. The president
should'-take care of.'something or "keep out" of an affair. As a nation we are qr"rick to call fbr
decisive action and equally quick to yell "foul""(Denton, 2005, p. 37). For exarnple, after the
attacks on September l l, President Bush took his role of Comrnander-in-Chief-to heart. acting in
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a way he and his advisors deternrined rvas best firr tlie country'' irncl r-rsing hisiurisdictior-r to nrake
such decisions on his o\vn accord (Stevenson.2005). Congress and the public were initially'
sr"rpportive of the tough stance and allorvecl tlie president sonre leewal'to respond. As Bush
fbund or-rt. presidents remtrin subfect to the constraints. chccks ancl balances of the system. The
legislative and judicial branches of gover"nnrent began to question the liberlies the executive
branch elected to take and dee rled some ol his actions. such as policies slrrrolrnding the holding
and torturing of detainees. Lrnconstitr,rtional. This is one exarlple where "(i)n the American
system of goverttntettt. strong executive leadership is at once unavoidable and Llnacceptable"
(Mari & McCatfrey, 2008. p. 96).
With little in the way of lole clarity orcleflnition, it appears that the president must
instead live up to expectations created hy the public. Increasingly. there is a gap betw'een what
the public expects of its presidents and rvhat prcsiclcnts actr-rally car-r accornplish - otherwise
known as the expectations gap thcsis (Watenran et al.. 1999). Fanlecl political scientist Richard
Neudstadt (1980) wrote that -'the put"rlic has conre to believe that the nran inside the White Housc
[can] do something about everything" (p.7). Some of these expectations include creating
successful policies. reducing Llnenrploymcnt. redr"rcirrg the cost of goventnrent, increasing
government ef1lciency. dealing et}-ectively with foreign policy. ancl strengthening national
defbnse (Waterman et al., 1999). J'l-rereirr lies the issr.re. .'The nation expects rrrore of the
President than he can possibly do. more than we give him either tl-re ar-rthority or means to do.
Thus. expecting fiom hirn the irnpossible. inevitably we shall be disappointed in his
perfbrmance" (Bronlow. 1 969, p. 35).
One particularly important and powerfirl element that is used to manage expectations in
presidential leadership is character. Shogan expressed that "character is a double-edged sword
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- an instrunrent that carr discredit presidents ancl destrol'their creclibility but atlso one that
presiclents can use to establish their political iclentity erncJ nrobilize support" 1as cited in Denton.
2005.p. 7). Iror example, according to an Associarted Press-lpsos poll, the nrajority of
Americans care less about issr,res than they clo abor-rt a canciidnte's character on the campaign
trail. Fifty-five percent of those sllrveyed consider honesty. inte-urity and other valr"res ol
character the most important clualities they look fbr irr a presiclential carrdidate. .lust one-third
look llrst to candidates' stattces on issues: even f-ew'er tilcus lbrenrost on leadcrship traits.
experience or intelligence. The poll tound honesty' was by fhr the r.nost popular single trait -
volunteered by fbrty-one percent o1'voters in open-ended cluestionin-e. The poll of 1.001 U.S.
Adr.rlts was conducted via landline and cell phorres betrveen March l2 and March 14,2007, ar-rd
had a ntar-eitt of sarnpling error of plus or minus 3 perccntage poirrts.
While the poll shows sonre consensus, charractcr is a broacl c'oncetrrt that citizens think
about in many difl'erent ways. Presiclents experience an expectatior.r -uap within the qualities
citizens believe a president shoulcl possess. -fhere Iacks consisterrcv around what every
American believes the president's role shor"rld be and what values thev shor-rld hold. Democratic
strategist Chris Lehane (2007) states, "modern dary presiclerrtial canrpaigns are essentially
character tests, with character broadly deflrred to encompass a nrosaric of traits - looks,
likeability. vision. philosophy, ideology, biography. conrnrunicatiorrs skills. intelligence,
strength, optirnism, effIpathy. ethics. valLles. anrong others" (Fourr-rier & Tompson, 2007).
Similarly, Kouzes and Posner (2007) surveyed the general pLrblic over the span of two
decades and identified characteristics most adrnired in leader"s primarilv tl'orn a business
perspective. Four qualities consistently topped the list. inclr-rding honest (88%), fbrward-looking
(7lyo). competent (66%) and inspiring (66yoi), whereas historian Stephen Ambrose states that the
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qualities of a great public leader are vision. integrity. courage. urrderstzrncling. the por,vcr ol-
articulation. and profirndity of character (Denton. 2005).
Presiclcntial scholar Fred Greenstein (2001) ofl-ers a widely recognized review oland
fianrervork bl"rvhich to evaluate presidential leadership. lnl'he Pres'iclentiul Dif./brcnc'c, lte
explores the leadership qualities and political contexts of every president beginning with
President Roosevelt. He identif-res, reviews and rates each president's strengths and weatknesses
within six criteria ir-rcluding comrrunication, orgernization. political skill. vision. cognitive style
and ernotional irrtelligence. Based on his analysis of presidential history, he suggests that
elnotionarl irrtelligence is the most important attribr"rte by which he means nraturity ancl level-
headcdness. I"or exarnple, he states that "(y)ou want a level lread. You neecl the ahility to control
yollr enrotions. Lack of irnpulse control in a president can be fatal in the nuclear r,r,urld'"
(Greenstein. 20 1 0. para.5).
With so many differing opinions and without a consistent clefjnitiorr in place by which to
cvaluatc prcsidential leadership, nranaging expectations and perceptiorr inadvertentlv beconre of
critical inlportautce to the president.
7'rantl,y i n Pra,t'itlenl iul Leuclership
One way to nranage sr"rch expectations is through image crezrtion. While success can be
linkecl to that which a president actually accomplishes during his or her time in ot1lce inrages
play atr itlportant role in the perceived slrccess or failLrre of olrr presidents" (Waterntan et al..
1999. p. 13). While each president develops his own personal image. Waterman et al. (1999)
outline three historical images that all presidents have adopted throughout American history.
These include common man presidents, master politician presidents and Washington or-rtsider
presidents. Along with each of these styles comes images and syrnbols that presidents take on
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along the rvay. A conrnron nran presiricnt adopts synrbols such as er log carbin or Anrericarr-tlrilt
car to show that he carr lelate to thc evcryday Arrerican: master politicians invohc a scnsc of
action. inrpl;-ing tliey'cirn nrove thror-rghor-rt the systenr: and Washington or"rtsiclers adopt svmbols-
such as a greelr school bLrs as aclopted by tbrmer Minnesota Scnator Paul We llstonc. to show thait
they are not really a part ol-the Washington establislrment.
A president rrust crafi an image that is specific to that particular point in tinrc and tl-re
circumstances at l-rarrcl. as w'cll as an image that flts the personality of the president. Sonre
presidents understoocl this corrcept more than others. as highlighted by Waterman et al. (1c)9t)):
(T)he eftervescence and reassuring personality olFranklin Roosevelt. his irnage as a r,'ital
activist. u'as perf-ect fbr a nation in the rlidst of a depression. Eisenhor,ver as "fhther
figure" presented the pcrf-ect in-rage fbr the less active governnrental erar ol'the I t)50s.
John Kerrnedy"s itrage of 1'or-rthlirl idealism was er perf-ect onc fbr the l-crrncnt ol'thc
19(r0s. Follor,ring the tirilurc of Vietnam. Reagan's image oltoLrglrness rvars idcal filr the
l9fl0s. On thc otlier hancl. clespite his considererble accomplishnrents. I-yndon.lohnsor-r's
dour image plovecl as electorally damaging as his Vietnarn War policies. Gerald F-orcl's
itnage as a likable "klutz" did little in 1916 to convince the pLrblic thart lre wars clLralitied to
be president. Likcwise. .limrny Carter's image of vacillation ancl inefl'ectiveness lireled
his electoral defbat in 1980. (p. 14-15)
This phenomenon is coined as the lmuge-is'-Everylhing presidency. It suggests that
citizens have become nlore concerned with irnage over policy substance, and that candidates and
politicians spend atr extraordinary amount of tinre and innumerable resources developirrg ar-r
image that will resonate with citizens. "Public expectations and perceptions are created througl-r
presidents'rhetoric, use of,symbols. rituals. and sense of history...the ot1lce is created.
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sr-rstained. ancl pernrcatecl thror-rgh interaction conrpr"ised of'carnpaigns, socialization, history ar-rd
myth" (Denton. 2005. p. 1 l).
One of the most powerfirl r,vnys presidents nranerge perception is through the rledia.
Beginning with ne\,vspapers in the days of (ieorge Washington all the way up to the social media
platfbrrls that helped get President Otlarla electecl. nreclia have played an integral role in shaping
and deflning a president's image, and presidcnts ancl their statf spend a considerable amount of
tirne tnanaging the media. In the past. newspilpers served as tlre only opportunity to connect with
a candidate or president and it was done so through tlre lens of the reporters or editors. but the
advent of radio and television have allowed the president to speak directly to the public. "The
president is no longer a renrote flgure. but a pcrson known to every American with a television
set" (Waternran et al.. 1999. p. 148).
One isst-te with managing inragc thror"rgh the rledia is that media is concemed with
providing entertainnrent value vcrslrs.jr-rst reporting the ner.vs. Viewers w'ant a level of
entertainrnent so the ne\\'s isn't alu,a1's t'cportecl as it happens or is enrbellished. Regardless,
people's expectatiotrs of the president have charrged with the advent of various fbn-ns of r-r-redia.
"Whether or not the president's perlirnrance is perceived to satisfy the public's expectations is
largely shaped by the image that is comnrr-rnicerted through the media" (Waterman et al.. 1999. p.
148).
We expect ntore today liom oLlr presidents than ever belbre, and adding to the paradox of
the offjce, those expectations are not static; they evolve depending on the point in time ancl
circumstance at hand. Citizens have dilhrent expectations of what is required. in wafiirne verslls
peacetime and in economic stability versus recession. regarding foreign atfairs or domestic
policies (Waterman et al. 1999). "Expectations shape action; action leads to further
Obanra's Ilcalth ('arc Itelixnr 3l
expectartions" (Hinckley. 1990" p. tl-g) What the public cxpccts is shaped bv whzrt thcv knou,.
and what the1, know is shaped by what they see.
Denton (2005) sums r-rp the above with three nrajor fhctors that have corrtrihutecl to our
vierv of the oflice today. "Previous administrations have lcft lcgacics of presidential conduct and
bel-ravior that have contributed to the forrnation of expectations of-specific behavior. real or
perceived... The role of mass rnedia favors images over substance... and thc pulrlic's open
recogrrition that all political talk is perfbrmance (Denton. 2005. p. l2l-122).
In addition. the advent of Internet and cable television lravc allowed ncws to bc
scgnrented ancl reported based on political ancl ideological bcliel. Liherals arrcl conservatives
alike have a microphone through which to report news w'ith a particular lens or point ol-view
versus reporting otr the agenda proposed by the current adrnirristration. Iracts bcconre clistorted
ancl people fbllowing news that only aligns with their political beliel.\ nri'rv not ever heeir the
entire or true story. These trends significantly in-rpact both the pul-rlic's expectatior-rs ancl tl-re
presiclent's role and ability to lead.
A president is elected to office on a parlicular platfbrnr. dr-rring a particr-rlar point in time
alrcl with a particular agenda in hand. Upon actually getting into ol'fice. a lrresident is rnet with
deep-seeded ideology, traditions. systems, nearly impossible expectations and unexpected events
tlrat are beyond the president's control. Without a clear or consistent deflnition in place,
presiclential leadership becoures known by a number of t-actors ir-rcluding the manetgerlent of
power. expectations. vision, image, character, perception and colrlmLlnication. A president rnust
flnd a way to break through the blocks and barriers to erchieve any kind of signif rcant refbrrrr.
Ol-rarla's Ilealtlr Care [tclbrrl i]
ll"hul Lc.tson.s'('un lJe Leurnetl firotu Pusl Ra.frtrtn l:.//itt't.t"/
I\4any, attenrpts zrt retbrnr have been rrade throu-{hout historv and there are plerrt}' tlf'case
studies. stories ancl exerrnples that a presider-rt carn study fbr keys to success and to avoicl the sanre
nristakes. In their hook l'he Heurl of Pott,ar: I-leullh und Politic',s'in the (rrul O.//it'e, Blurlenthal
and Morone (2009) explore lrealth care underthe leadership o1'the perst eleven adn-rirristrations
that served in the White House. They highlight the unique f-eatures of'each adrninistration and
or-rtline the ideas that earch pronroted. the institutions they built. and the health policies pursued
tutrder each administration. They ofl-er a simple deflnition ol'presidential leadership: "the abilit.v
to lay out a vision and a conrpelling case fbr moving toward it" (Blumenthal & Mrtrone.2009. p.
417). Based orr their review of past adrninistrations. they otfbr eight lessons lbr firtLrre
adnrinistrations to achieve sllccess when atterr-rptirrg refbnn. Tlrese include prassion. spced"
bringing et plan. lrr"rshing the econorlists. going public. managing Con-{r'css. lbrgetting the
PSI{Os. and lcartring ltorv to lose (Blurnenthal & Morone" 2009). While the lcssons nrav bc
applied to otltcr tvpes of refbrrn. tlieir prirrary fbcus is on health carre relbrnr. A bricIc]cscription
of each lesson is provided.
As was seelt throughout history, health ciire is a hotly debated and dir,isivc issue. anc-l the
authors name passiorr as the tirst key to success when attempting health care relbrnr. '[he1,
suggest that. u,ith all the demands placecl on the otllce arrd the level of risk involvecl ir-r
atternpting relbrm. only a president who feels deeply abor-rt the issue should atterlpt it. A
president rnay only w'in a handtirl of changes while in ofllce, and refbrnr takes dedication and a
commitment to the cause. Passion rnust be at the heart of the matter.
Speed is the second lesson they oflbr, meaning a plan should be submitted fbr
consideration as quickly as possible. Based on history. the closer the presider-rt proposes a plan
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to tlte tirst day in ofllce. the greatcr thc likelihood 1br successfirl adoption. In sonre instances.
presicients get a second chitnce later in their"terrl if otl-rer big events have taken precedencc. but
given the electiotr 1-rroccss and lirnits on the terrrs that can be served. the best chance a presidcnt
l-ras to pass arry kincl of nririor lcgisliition is early' in thc terrn.
While irrtrodr"rcitrg a plarr earll'or-r is a key to sr,rccess, equally irrrportant is that a president
brings a plan to tl-re oflrce. ""I'he White I Iouse is rro place tbr scherr-ring up health refbrnr
legislatior"r'" (Blumenthal & Morone. 2009. p. 112). This lesson suggests that work should begin
well befbre taking otfrce so that no tinre is wasted once a president is sworn in. In addition. this
allows tl-re presiderrt"s visiot-t and intention fbr retbrm to be clear, and sets the president and
public's expectations surrouncling thc issue.
Econotlics hets arlu'ays lreert a big part o['the concern within health care retorrn. as
expanding coveragc ncver llts anl' lrucl-uct. Successlirl refbrm is achieved when a presiderrt is
able to htrsl-r the ecittronrists. thc tburth lcssori when attempting refbrrn. Budget drives a big part
of the l-realtlr ceu'e con\/crsatiorr. itncl cconomists are concerned with outlining the risl<s involved
w'ith any plan. -l'he authors suggcst that. "presidents who seek to expand health coverage need to
flnd the sell'-corrtldcnce to overrule thcil clisnral scientists and plunge ahead" (Blurrrenthal &
Morone, 2009. p. 41.1).
One way a president calr gain that sel[confldence is by showing that he has the support
of the people. which leads to tlte inrporteurce o1'the next lesson-goingpublic. A president,ul,ho
is serious about healtl-r care must nrake it a priority on the campaign trail, and share a vision that
resonates with and inspires people to support it. 'fhe president mnst continue to campaign fbr the
callse once in oflce by commutricating the vision and ideas within the plan to the public, why
the issue is of such great inrportance and how the issue is relevant to thern. Meclianow of-fers the
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opportunity to cotlrect'ur,'itlt the putrlic 24 hours a cla1 . allowing the presicletrt plentv of
opportunities to get in liont of the public to coumLlnicatc the niessage.
Lesson six discr-rsses the recluirernent of'tlre plesiclent to tre able to manage Congress.
Ours is one of the most cornplex political systerls and "'the successful president must be nimble
at rnaking our convoluted legislative process wol'k'" (Blurlenthal & Morone, 2009, p. a16). Past
presidents who experienced success are serid to have l"reen able to build relationships across party
lines, employ talented legislative teeutts to serve as liaisons ancl nrarneLrver the system on the
president's behalf-. They were Lrnconcernecl with getting the credit. publicly gave credit to others.
and were present when they needed to be.
As the next lesson, Blumenthal and Morone recor-nr-nencl that a president forget the
PSROs. or Profbssional Stzrndard Revierv Orgarrizations. These grolrps were set r"rp to monitor
health insurance programs. Ireanirt-rr thev arc ingrairrccl in thc nrinute details of plar-rs.
Blumenthal and Morone (2009) use this phlase as a nreans to irrply that the presiderrt should not
get bogged down in details or day-to-day managemerrt of.thc plan. They sr"rggest that the
president should say fbcused on the big picture. the national debate or the Congressional process.
Related to managing Congress, one cern do this by nraking sure the right people are ir-r place to
help delegate the work that needs to be done.
The flnal lesson states tl-rat a presiderrt shoulcl learn how to lose. Many have tried and fbw
have succeeded in passing health care retbrrn. llven in losing. there are lessons to be learned that
can assist in setting the tone tbr flrture conversations and plans. In health care. more ef1brts have
been lost than won, so Blurnenthal and Morone (2009) suggest that the president should prepare
fbr this fate but should also respect that even a loss will shape the future of the issue.
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'l'hese eight lessons 
- 
passion. speed. bLinging a plan. hushing the econonrists" going
public. nranaging Congress. lbrgetting the PSROs. and learning to lose 
- 
provide a tinrelv.
relevant and appropriate fiamelvork fion-r which to evaluate Obanra s leadership in the passir-rg ol
recent health cale refbrur. What was it abor-rt this particular tinre and place that allowed refbrrn
to come to tiuition? How did President Obarna fare within the fi'anrerl'ork presented by
Blumenthal and Morone, and what additional other lessons nright he lcarned?
Analysis of President Obama's Leadersl-rip ol'Hcalth Carc Rcform
Many presidents have tried but fbw have succeeded irr gerrerarling such sweeping health
care re Iorm as President Obarna. when, under his watch. histrlric legislation was perssed.
Irollowing is an overview of the events that led to the passing ol-the Putiurl Protection und
A/fbt'cluhle C'ure Act, as well as ar"l analysis of Presidcnt Olranra's leadership u,ithin t]-re context of
presidential leadership previor"rsly described eurd thc eight lessons sLl-sgcstecl b1, Blunrenthal and
Mororre.
Rc./brm E.//irt.s (Jntler Pre.yiclent ()bumu
Similar to Presiclent Clinton, Obama begar-r his health care crusarcle on the presidential
carnpaign trail. He pledged to curb rising health care costs. cncl ahusive practices by private
itrsurers. and expatrd insurance coverage to uninsured Arnericans (L)unham.20l0). Anotherpart
of his campaign plattbrm was the promise to reach across party lines arnd try'to flnd comlrron
*uround atlongst lawmakers in Washington. President Obanra"s (2008) vision. in his own words:
Sign into law a health care plan that gr-rarantees aflbrdable. quality insr"rrance tbr every
American who wants it; brings down premiums fbr every family who currently has
coverage; boosts quality; requires coverage of preventative czlre; reduces the price of
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prescription clrr-rgs: ernd stops insurancc companies f}om deny'ing coverage basccl orr
preexisting conditiorrs. (p. I9)
Llpon etrterit-t-e ofljce. Presiderrt Obarla fbund hinrsell'with a high approval rating arrd
high expectatiorrs liont tlre t,oters who elected hirn into of1lce (SteinhaLlser" 2009). I-lc also
fbr-rnd the country in the biggest recession since the Great Depression. in the rnidst of'tw'o r,r,'ars in
Iraq and Afghanistarn. and n,ith the highest unemployment rates in decades. With all olthe othcr
issues tacing the country artd the aclrlinistration. Obarna's advisors f'eared pr-rshing liealth cale
would be bad fbr the systenr ancl put hinr at risk fbr future political def-eat. President Obar-na
elected to tnake health crlre his clonrestic priority because he thought tl-rat the current state of
health care was linancially urrsustainable. -il-re barrd-aid approach of past ef forts cor-rlcl not tlx thej
system - structural changcs \ver"e reclr-rircd. I-le understood that it r,vould be an uphill battle anrl he
Irad no expectittiotts that he r,roulcl u'in cver"yone over in the process. br-rt he trelievecl it r.las the
right thing to clo (Alter.2010). In a specch befbre a joint session in February 2009. President
Oban-ra tolci Con-srcss "neiirlr a ccr-rtur1'afier Teddy Roosevelt called fbr relbrnt. thc cost ol-our
l-realth care llzrs w'eighecl dorvn i)Llr econonry and the conscience of our nation long enough. So
let there be no cloubt: Health care refbrnr cannot wait. it must not wait. and it will not wait
another year (para. 57).
Presiclent Obanta face'd a tumultlroLls road paralleled to that of history in his quest tbr
refbrm. Sinrilar to the perioc'licity olhealth care throughout history,he experienced setbacks
along the way. Shortly' alier he took oftlce" Obama faced his flrst of many when the person he
had enlisted to spearhead this ef1brt. Senate Majority leader Tom Daschle. withdreu, as the health
and human services secretary atier it was discovered that he was late in paying his income taxes.
'['o tnany, this signarlecl politics as nsual in the White House as opposed to the change he
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pronrised during his carnpaign. It also addccl a lavcr ol'conrplexit-v* irr stafflng the White IIouse
as vetting. or background checks. becalle like airport securit\'. Anv potential stat'l'nrenrber
being considered lor a.iob within the rarnks of'the White House now faced an evelr rrore
rigorous, thorongh and time cor-rsunring background check to save the adrninistration the sarre
embarrassment of previor-rs appointrlents. "l-he Obarra admirristration. like those befbre it,
didn't dare rein in the process fbr fbar of seenrin-u ethically challenged or insr-rtflciently aware of
the political costs ot'hurniliating publicity"' (Alter. 2010" p. l2l).
President Obama lauuched refbnn eflirrts with a White Flor,rse tbrurl in March of 2009
and inclr,rded a cross-section ol indr-rstry. Congressional. nnion and think tank experts. Durirrg
this fbrum he announced his intention to pass a plan by the end of 2009 as w,ell as his expectation
tl-rat Congress work together to deliver a plan try Auglrst. While Obanra put Health Care on the
list of dorrrestic priorities. hc could rrot clo thc r,r'urk hiurself and he looked to Speaker of the
House, Nancy Pelosi. and Senate Ma.jorit-r' [-caclcr. FIarry Reicl to lead the charge. The two
wor-rld become synonynrolls rvith rcfbnl ancl iustrunrcnti,rl in shaping and championing the isslle.
Town-hall style treetings were set-lrp fbr citizerrs to nreet with local representatives in Congress
thror-rghout the country and nrany Anrericans tunred up to show their displeasure with the
proposed changes to health care. 't'he biggest issues tiom opponents. as has been consistent
througl-rout l-ristory. ranged fl'orrr concerns over the proposed public option. to governrnent
involvement and regulation. to loss olbenetlts arrd changes to current plans (Dur-rham.20l0).
Sirnilar to President Clinton. Obama had the best ol interrtions. Perhaps learning fiom his
predecessor, he attempted to put the right people in charge, to brirrg people together to discr-rss
the issr-res in a public fbrmat, to get the input fiom Congressional leaders across party lines, and
to create a plan that incorporated the input and Llpou which all could agree. However, opponents
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ancl their allies hacl dilf-erent plar-rs. Thev hard no irttcntiot"t ol'w'orking n,ith Otranra or his
adnrinistrzrtion because a win on health care or anv issue tbr that nratter signaled the strerrgth ol'
his ancl the Dernocratic Party's position. Opponcnts clicl a better.iob ol-corlmunicating their
point olview with the public and in doing so cor.rlirsed and dilutecl Olranra's (l-11,'nes.2010).
Corrgress was r-rnable to deliver a plarn h1, August. and in Septerlber. PresicJer-rt Obama
restated his intentions to tackle health care relbrnr and his erpectations of Congress to deliver a
plarr. ln November and December of 2009. Prcsiclent Obama saw refbrrn take its flrst small steps
when both the House and the Senate passed initial bills. albeit.iust lrarely with 220-215 and 60-
39 votes respectively. While initizrlly a part of Obama's vision. only thc House bill contained a
public option. T'he hope was to merge the two bills and sencl along to Obanra fbr approval, but in
.lanuary 2010 refbrm eflbrts received a blorv vr,'hcn Massachusetts Republican Scott Browr"r won
the special Senate election. replacing Democrat'l-ecl Kcnnedl r,r,ho hacl passerl erway and had
cledictrted his litb to working on healtl-r care issr"rcs. 'l'hc Scnate no lor.r,eer had the votes they
needed to get past a fllibuster and refbrnr eflirrts \\erc put orr holcl ([)unhanr.2010).
Sonre saw the election as a sign that the voting public clid not want hearlth care refbnn to be a
priority, but Obarna, with encollragernent fl'orr Pclosi. continucd pushing tbr health care refbrm.
"According to published reports. when President Obanra was conternplarting a contpromise with
Repr-rblicans. and White House Chief of Statf Rahrl Erlanuel and Senate Majority Leader Harry
tteid (D-Nev.) w'ere advocating a less-ermbitious urcasure (,uvhich Pelosi derided as "kiddie-
care,") she persuaded thern to stick with an orrnibr"rs bill" (Bzdek.2010, para. 8). Pelosi
expressed her fiustration with the president as tilr months. slre and Senator Reid had worked
diligently on President Obama's Iegislative priority, putting their names. relationships and
potentially their political careers on the line. and Pelosi wanted afflrmation that the president was
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in the light n,ith thenr. In addition. Obama had not yet statecl publicll vrhat he u,'ar.rted to see in a
health care bill and on this point she challerrged the president. ('ongressiorral leacJers wanted tcr
know u,here lrc stood on the issue and the lack of clarity onlv r-nacle Pelosi arrd I{eid's rvork that
rrruclr ntore ditflcult (Hulse. Stolberg & Zeleny.20l 0).
ln Februarry 2010. one yearatiertaking ofllce, Obaura helcl a bipartisan healthcare
slrrnmit to discLrss moving tbrward with comprehensive healtlr care reforrl (l'}elosi.2010). The
surnmit is said to be the flrst of its kind in the memory of most legislertors ("Derlocrats
considet'." 2010). Pelosi and Democratic leaders were skeptical. but the sumrlit marked the
turning point in the debate, as it showed Obama reaching out to Republicerns. tbrced the
Republicans to put their ideas on the table, and ultirnately put the debate back on the national
agerrda (Hulse. Stolberg &.Zeleny.20l0). It was televised on CSPAI\. where hcated debarte and
excltalt-{es could be witnessed between the president and opponerrts ol-the plan. At the sante
tinte. Detttocrtttic leaders. Pelosi and Reid in particular. relincprished the idea o1'appezrsing
Itepublicans ancl itrstead focused on moving ltrrward with a plarr ol'w,hich a nrafority'of the
Denrocratic Party cor-rld agree ("Democrats consider," 20l0). Obama then released his ow'n plan.
which was br-rilt on the Senate version of the plan and convincccl wavering Denrocrats that a loss
on this issue woLrld be amzrjorsetbackto theparty in terms of being ablc to accomplish other
priorities. sttch as.jobs and immigration, as well as potential ranriflcations in upcoming mid-term
electiorrs. Therefbre, Democrats who did not initially support President Obarra's vision
eventually did so in the end to help strengthen both his authority and the party's position.
On March I B, 2010, House Democrats unveiled legislation to irnprove the Senate-passed
bill to aclrieve three key goals, including "aflbrdability fbr the middle class. accessibility fbr all
Americans. and accountability forthe insurance indr-rstry" (Pelosi.2010). Three days later. the
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I-lrrr-rse passed the Sertate version and ort Marclt 23.2010. OLrama sigrred the Pulicnt Protct'tiou
urut .l//orduhlc ('ut'c.{c'l into leru. A r,veek afier the passing of the bill Obarna acknou,ledgetl.
"...tliis retbrrr will rrot solve e\/cl')'problenr rvith ilur health care systenr. It will rrot bring clou'n
the cost of health care overnight. We'll have to nlnke sonre adjustrnents along the vva),. IJut it
represe nts enonnous progress (Lee. 2010. para. 21 ). According to the White House"
"indepetrdent experts have fbr"rrrd thal the new law helps reduce costs fbr fanrilies and businesses.
cuts the deflcit ernd strengthens Medicare. adding years to the trust firnd while maintaining
seniors guaranteed beneflts. J'he Congressiorral Budget Ottlce, the government's lton-partisan
scorekeeper. said the Afllbrdablc'Care Act wolrld save over S100 billion ovcr the next ten y,ears.
and over' $ I trillion in the fbllowing decade" (201 0).
A.y.t'e,s',s'irtg Prt:,sidant Ohuntu',s' Lcutlcrs'hip in Re/brm Ef./ot't.r
Obatnra"s lcaclership clLrring the refbmr process has been nret with nlixecl crnotirins.
Iteports rrflry on the clarity ancl pllrpose of his vision. his comrnunicatior-r with ('ongress anc'l the
pLrblic. and his lcvel of participation in the process. At the sante time. and as is consistent vu,itlr
l-ristory. "health insurance... had no chance without vigorous White House leadership"
(Blumenthal & Morone.2009, p. ll). I will assess Presider-rt Oban-ra's leadership r,v,ithin the
fiatnew'ork ol'eight lessons presented Lry Blumenthal and Morone, and. based on the lcarning
fi"orl his efforts. will otl'er additional lessons ltlr consideration.
President Obarr-ra w.as passionate about health care refbrrn. From an econonric stanclpoint.
he believed that the current systern was financially unsustainable. Politically. he knew it wor.rlc'l
be a challenge and potentially damaging to his career. Personally, he heard the powerfirl stories
of struggles fiorn citizens around the country and he promised to create change.
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While he was passionate abrxrt tlie isslre. there are slrggestiorrs tliat hc did a nrediocre -iob
of short'irrg it. This cannot tre attributcd to his l-celirrgs nhout the isslle. ltather. it is simply due to
his personal style. President Obanra is knou'n fbr his cool. calm. collected demeanor. which is
seen as positive under most circunrstances. "'l'he presiclent... has shown f-ew.glintpses into his
inner decision-making process, but the irnage he presents to the country and to the world is one
of a calrl and steady leader who refirses to get bogged ciown in day-to*day skirmishes"
(Yor-rngrtan.2010, para. 3). This is sin-rilzrr to w'hat Greenstein (2010) ref-ereed to as emotional
intelligence. By his definition, enrotional intelli-uence - levelheadeclness - is of utmost
importance tbr a president and Obarna certainly fits this delrnition. '"Obama chooses to fbcr-rs on
the larger view and long-ternr picture n'hile delegatirrg his nngcr or outrzrge over daily partisan
and pr,urdit attacks to...White Hor,rsc clrielol-statf Rahnr Etlar-tr-rrl ancl others" (Youn-{rrau. 2010.
pelra. 10). When it came to talking ahout health care. holvcver'. nrany rnissed seeing sorne kind of
eruotion fiom Obarna. which helps the pLrblic relate to the prcsident. His ilrage has been
consistent throughout liis canlpilign and tinre in ol cc. uhich is henefrcial lbr keeping his stafT
fbcLrsed but a challenge fbr the public looliirrg fbr sonrething tu rvhich they can relate.
President Obarna otrtlinecl lris initial vision orr the canrpai,en trail and presented his
expectations to pass legislation within his trrst year in oftlcc-just afier his inauguration. Advisors
sttggested that he take up the issue later in liis temr, but he recognized that his best chance to
accomplish any kind of refbrnr \vas prior to the 2010 micl-term elections and with the support of
a Democratic-controlled legislatr-rre. He was nof concerned with passirrg the perf-ect plan; rather,
he believed the process had to start sorlewhere. In terms of the lesson ol speed, President
Obama was quick to make health care relbrm a domestic priority and began conversations with
Congress and the public immediately.
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'l'he presidenl expressed his vision earrly on cluring the carnpaign trail. set the tone lbr Iris
acir-ninistration on a platfbrm fbr change and outlir-recl his expcctations tt.r pass refbrnr to
f'ongress. His plan was to set the fl'amework and then illlor,r the parrties to work together to
create the best plan fbr the country. This w'as deliberate and aligned r,r,'ith health rcfbrni activists
who expressed that "the only way to win this timc was to stav vague. defbr to Corrgress. and buy
off the powerfirl interest grolrps...that sank refbmr in lt)94" (Alter.2010" p.251). President
Obama campaigned on the promise of changing Washinglon and believed in the power of
lrrirrging people together to f-rnd comrnon ground. In theory this w'as idcal. but irr practice this
proved to be a much bigger challenge than he anticipated.
l-Jnfbrtunately, Congress \A,as not able to work togethcr trs he had hoped. Republicans
deliberately refr.rsed to work together with neither Presiclcnt Obanra nor f)ernocratic leaders. and
tlrcy'challcnged him by clairning that he was not fbcused on the right isslrcs (such as-iob
creatiotr). irrstilling f-ear that he was tryirrg to create a socialist svstenr. ancl bv highlighting that
even his ovrn party could not get aligned on the issue. u,'hich irr nranv \\avs rvas true. Opponents'
prirtrary concern was to def-eat Obama. wl-rich signalecl sorlething largcr thern the issue of health
care. Def-eating refbrm would call Obama's leadership ar-rcl power into cluestion. and opponents
r,tsed every tactic in their powerto fiustrate refbrnr. fronr rlobilizing protesters. to crashing the
town hall fbrr-uns, to threatening those within their own party who corrsiderecl supporting the
president's agenda. Those who chose to support the president risked political scrutiny, which
Iray have tr"rture implications on an official's ability to get reelected.
Detlocrats struggled within their own party dr-re to a variety of reasons such as difl'ering
opinions on the best approach, how to work with Republicans, ancl how to pay fbr it. Some
Democrats expressed the need fbr a greater presence fiom President Obama in the process than
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he irritially shou,ed. artcl sorne \\iere concerned that the RepLrblicarr upset in thc special clcctiorr
was a sign fiorl vr>ters that other issltes were of gr"eater irnportance ("Denrocrats Cor-rsicler."
2010). In his attenrpt [o leave power in the hands of Congress and his belielthat people rvorking
together will create the trost acceptable plan. his ar-rthority wers r-rltirnatel,v called into qr-rcstion
and perception was such that Otrarna was not able to manage the systenr.
Consistent with this theme is a poll fi"om Gallup (2009) that reportecl Anrericans had lost
sol.ne confldence in his ahility to nranage the governrnent effectively. Near the 100-day rtrar"l< ol'
lris presidencl'. 660A of Americans believed he was eflectively marragirrg tlte governrtrerrt. That
declined to 5L)o/o in.luly and 55o/oin Septen-rber (Gallup,2009). On a positivc fiont. the poll also
reported that. althougl-r Oban"ra rnay have failed to achieve much bipartisan agrccntent on nrei-ior'
policies. (r0%n of'Anrericans gave him credit tbrtrying. In addition. it shor,vecl that Anrcricatrs
w'ere tlttch less likely to believe mcmbers of Congress oleither party \,vel'c [l'r,in-, [o r"r'ork
together. Only'33o/o said the Republicans and 38% said Democrats \vere rlaking a sinccrc ellilrt.
Rcsults are bascd on telephone interviews with 1.030 national erdults. aged I tl ancl olcler'.
conducted Septerlber 1l and September 13,2009. The margin of sarrrplirrg errcr'is +4
percentage poirrts. Interviews were conducted with respondents on letndline teletrlhones (lbr
respclndents w'ith a land-line telephone) ancl cellular phones (fbr respondcnts who are cell-phone
only). It was not r-rntil he restated his intentions to pass refbrm in Septernher 200i). relinquished
his rreed to herve bi-partisan sllpport, released his own plan in Februar.v 2010 rvhich rrol'e clearly
stated his expectations and once again shared stories of everyday Arnericerns who strr-rggled
because ol issr-res related to health care as he had on the carnpaign trail that thc president frnally
saw traction and the eventual passing of refbrm.
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E,conomics were a prinrar')' rearson that Presiclent Obama lrelicved the L]nited States
needed refbrnr. and a l'cason hc was passionate abor"rt change. As was previor"rsly statecl. hezilth
cal'e expenditlrres in tlre LJnited States surpassed $2.3 trilliou in 2008. The average resident spent
$7,681 per person and health care accor-nrted lbr 16.zoh ol'the nation's Gross Don-restic Product
(GDP) (Health Aftairs.20l0: Kaiser Fanrily Foundation. ?010. lJ.S. Departrnent o1'Health and
Human Services, 2010). Ilresiclent Obama created the case to the economists that refbnl could
help manage the budget by redr,rcing costs paid by consunrers and the government long ternr.
The president outlinccl his ir-rtention that refbrnrs wor"rld be irnplemented over time and the tlnal
bill that was passed will supposedly sa\ic $100 million over the next ten years and over $1
trillion in the fbllou,ing decade. This ciid not stop opponents fiom touting the proposed price tag
and fiom clairling that retbrnr rvor-rld increase costs to taxpayers" reduce the quality and place
unwanted regulations on tlteir care. but Obanrzl \,as able to nrake the case to the decision nraliers
that this woulcl benefrt the cor.rrrtr\,'c flnarrcials long-terrn.
Building support fbr a policv rvith the public is a maior requirement of refbnr. and going
public is one way to do tlrat. Blumenthal and Morone (2009) suggest that communication ntust
come fl'orn the presider-rt himself directly to the people. They argLre that in order to win support.
the president rnust serve as the face olrefbrm and must instill the vision while showing how it is
relevant and manageable. As Denton (2005) states, "(i) t isn't accomplishments that rlark a
president as a sllccess or f ailure. br-rt how that president's message is communicated and lrow it is
perceived by the American people" (p. 52). President Obama outlined his vision Ibr refbrn-r
early on and inspired initial support fbr the plan in the rhetorical sense. Once in ofIce. he was
clear that he considered it a domestic priority and was clear about the timefiame by which he
expected plans to take fbrm; however, he was not able to rnaintain the momentum he
Obania's llcaltli f'arc Rclirnrr 45
experienced on the cernrparign treril. Prcsident Otranra was not able to articulate tlic reason fbr the
refbrm in a way that conncctccl rvith people to rnake thcnr urrderstancl r,r'irv it r,vas inrportant.j
when nrany Anrericzrns saw issues such as-lotr creation as L-reing of higher priority. [-le also was
not able to help the public r,rnderstancl hurn, spencling today on refilrrn wor-rld save nroney in the
long run. The administration chose to talk to the llublic about health care in terr-ns nf poti.y un.f
change, but without a personal connection to the issue. the public had a dif1lcult tin-re grasping it.
As is apparent throughor-rt the history olhealth czrre. it is a complex issue arrd the best way to
break thror"rgh a cornplicated issue is to show'how it is relevant. Late in the debate, President
Obarna went back to telling stories of ever)'day' Anrericans who struggled with issues related to
the health care system as he ltard done in the earlS,,clays on lhe canrpaign trail. but it w'as a little
too late to see widespread pLrblic support - particulnrll'r,r'hen the opposition had treetr so vocal.
One lesson that President Obanra lirlloucil w'ell u,as r.rot til get bogged down ir-r the details
of a plan and instead stick to tlie big picture. 'l'his entzrils rnakir-rg slrre the right people erre put in
place to lead the charge . Nancy Pelosi in particular rvas a nralor clriving fbrce in the passing o1'
health care refbnn. In a.Ianuar\')B press conference. Pelosi (2010) stated "(u,)e w'ill go through
the gate. [f the gate is closed. rve will go over the t'ence. lf thc ltnce is too high. w'e will pole
vault in. If that doesn't work. wc will paracl-rr-rte in. But we are going to get health refbrm passed"
(Speaker Nancy Pelosi online). She was the ideal candiclate as her style rnirrors the approach
Obama said he wanted to see used in Washington - that of listenir-rg. talking about the issues,
and working together to accomplish goals. Retbrm advocates consider her a hero in the health
care crusade as she worked tirelessly to pass relbrm. her vote-gatlrering and coalition-building
skills cited specifically in why refbrrn was possible. The president also surrounded himself with
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stal'f'that. everr u,hen thev did not agree rvith the initial clecision to tackle health care. trusted ernd
sr-rpportecl the presiderrt and workec'l diligentl_v to ensure that lris vision bcclin"lc realitl'.
l'he tlnal lesson. learning to lose. is one that President Otranra knew'\\'as a possibility and
the ratlifrcations of Iosing wor.rlci be great. if legislation did not happcn inlnrecliatell, that it
would be a considerable amount of tin-re befbre the debate could evcr start again. Another
drivirrg factor also nray have been Obama's relationship with Senator I'cd Kcnnedy r.n,ho fbught
diligently fbr refbnn throughout lris entire career. Kerrnecly w,as a nrentur to Ofro,r',ar ll'otn the
tirnc he flrst entered the Senate, and Obama considered the day Kennedy endorscd him fbr
presidenl ats one of the best days olhis lif-e (Smith & Martirr.2009). Ilis personarl conrnritrlent to
Setrator Kennedy's work added a human element to his determination to sec rcfbrrtr throLrgh. As
merrtioned" the prcsident was rtot concernecl with passing a pcrf-ect bill and hc uncler"stood that
bills eu'e updated artd reworked over tinre. IIis primary conccnrs to cur'b rising health cltre costs.
ettd abusive practices by private insurers. and expand insr-rrancc co\/erage to unir-rsurecl
Attrericans appearto have been met with the bill. arrd tirne vrill tell ilthe irriplcnientatiun hasthe
desired efl-ect. Both the successes and setbacks fionr the past year can he revielved and r.l'ill set
f utr"rre refbrnr conversati ons.
Blunrentlral and Morone (2009) oftered an interesting and relevarnt lcrrs tlrrou-uh which to
view President Obama's leadership. and the president and his adrninistration \\,ere the first to
have attetnpted refbrrn since these lessons were off'ered. Evaluatin-u Presicleut Obernta s
leadership within tl-ris fiarrtework, he receives high marks fbr specd. bringing a plan, hushing the
econotnists, leading at a high level and putting the right people irr place: firred well w'ith passion
and learning to lose; and lefi some roonr for irnprovement in terms of lrow managing Congress
and going pLrblic.
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In reviewing the events of the past year in the context of their lessons. therc arc n l.erv
additional lessons that nri-uht also be consiclered fbr an adnrinistration attempting refbt'nr. such as
creating tlre right inrage. bringing people together. nraintaining a sense of pr-rrpose and rcnraining
ar-rtl-rerrtic.
'['he public has unusually high expectations of a president, and a president's inrage plays
an extretr"rely itlportarrt role in how an issue is perceived and even the eventual or-rtcontc. As wets
explained. a presidcnt's role ntust change and evolve clepending on the issue at hand. ancl a
president nrust ttnderstand w'hart type olleadership is required fbrthat particr"rlar point in tinte.
As was described within []lr-rrlenthal and Morone's lesson olgoing public. the president rlust
serve as the firce of thc issr-re. but eclually important is the need to understand what farce is
required. Within rccent presiclencies. inrage is everything and understanding what inrnge. in
addition to wltat lritnagenrent st1,'le. is required will allow a president to get through tcl the pulrlic.
For exatlple . Ilresiclettt Obanra knew that his message was not breaking through to the public.
Part ol'that rvas his cool ancl collectecl leardership style; part was that tlre ntessage raras trot
personal or relevant: part of it was opponents had a consistent, unitled rnessage. Wherr he sall'
this was happerring" the comnrllnication strategy shitted to one of storytelling that hacl bcen so
cornpelling on the canrpaign trail. A leader"shor-rld understand what image errrd style is rcquired
when atternpting create change.
Bringing people togetlrer is becoming more and rnore ir-nportant. President Obama
strongly believed in this notion and campaigned on this idea being a platfbrm fbr change in
Washington, w'hich Americans appeared to have appreciated when they elected hirn into ofllce.
The previot-ts administration, led by George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, had
greatly expanded the president's power during their eight years in ot1lce (Stevenson. 2005). The
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adrlinistratior"r becanre knor,r'n fbr its authuritarian st1'le and fbr nraking clecisions in a silo. ancl
the Atlerican public artci Iawrriakers alike camc,o Or.rt,on the authority olthe presidency.
Voters had grown werlrv ol'wurn-oLrt politics erncl he inspired hotrre that leadership could be
dilferent.
As with each president before hin-r. Presiclent Obanra came to the White Flor-rse with a
ditterent approach. He would lead by,' Iistening. attenrpt to reacl-r across Party lirres. and. learning
fionr mistakes olprevior"rs aclministrations' closed-door policies. he comrnitted to leacling a
transparent administratiot-t. Ilresiclent Oberrna applied this approach in the beginning of health
care refbrrn. He laid out a vision firr the plan but leti it to Congress to work through the details
together. He set r"rp bi-partisan slunn-rits fbr lawnrakers and town-hall fbruurs fbr the American
public to have inpLrt and to voice tlrcir opinior-rs. Hc invited social rnedia fbllow.ers to sharc
personal storics o1'why'health care relilrrl nrattered through email and Facebool<. It wers
important 1o rlake people 
- his stall. lawrlakers. and the American public - 
leel as if their
voices were being heard. Despitc oppolrcnts" resistance. President Obarla is given credit fbr
trying to bring people together to corle up w'ith the best plar-r. The presider-rt must recognize if
and when the process is not r,vorking and havc the courage to ntove fbrw'ard withor-rt those who
might not be on board. but. like thc lesson of learning to lose. brirrging people together to work
and have crucial conversations provides the opportunity to learn fl'om one another. to potentially
flnd better solutions. and to beconrc aligned on the issues.
Setting a vision is an extrenrell, important part of any refbrrn, but rnaintaining a sense of
purpose thror-rghout tl-re process is eclr-rally important. Purpose helps provide clarity fbr the issue.
For those debating refbrrn within Congress, it helps fiame the issr-re in a way that shows how it is
relevant to the country and constituents" and fbr those in the general pr.rblic, it helps provide the
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answer 1br why ar palticulzrr issue is irnportant to aclclress. It is saicl that Presiclent Obarna begins
his workdal'by readirrg letters rvritten to hirl lrv evcrrclav Anrcricans espressing their thoughts.
hopes. issues and concerns. These lettels are saicl to har,'c hclped liinr stay connected to the issue
and the reason to continue pushing fbr refbnn. l\4aintaining i-r scnse ol-pr,rrpose also helps ensLtre
the passion fbr the issLre stays alive.
The tinal additional lesson is remaining authentic. Presidentiatl power is created and
shaped by public expectations and perceptiorr. ancJ those expectations stenr fr"om a president's
irlerge and character. As discussed. a rla-jority' ol'Americans tend to carc ntore about character
than issues. People lrave a need to feel that thel' r-rnderstand tl-rc type of person a president is and
that l-re understands what is important to tlrenr. I-lverr cluring the heat of refbrrn eflorls, Obama
still scorecl high tnarks with voters ort character. Iror"eranrplc. thc Gallup poll previously
clescribed stated that640/o t'elt that Presiclent Obarra unclcrstiinds the problems Anrericans fhce in
their daily lives. Gallr,rp (2009) reported that no lcss than sixtt,-three percent of Arnericans have
said this about the presider-rt since thc'charactcristic uas llrst rlcasured in March 2008. It also
concludecl that 72% Ieel that Obama is n'illing to nrzrkc hard dccisions and 66% believe hirn to be
a strong and decisive leader. President Obama renrerinccl aLrthentic throughout the process and
even those who do not agree with his policies ur cluubt liis ability'to rnanage the system have
rarely questioned his character. He attempted to reach across party lines yet when people were
not willing to cooperate, he electecl to renrain true 1o lris visior-r- true to his word and true to
hirnself in the process. Authenticity is an inrportarrt lessor-r. as an ar-rthentic leaderwill remain a
respected leader long afier the dust has settled.
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In-rplications fbr Leading Clrangc
Only zl4 people have served as president of the L.lnitecl States. ancl Iess than a third ot
those chose to or were fbrced to address heerlth care relbnr. lrr-rt their erpcrierice ol'l'ers lessons
tilr leailers of all levels. particularly those striving to create organizational change. Lessons
outlir-recl by Blumenthal and Morone (2009) and additional lessons glearlecl fiorl Presiclent
Obama's eflbrts within health care refbrm offbr solid advice fbr how to approach and irnplerlent
change.
Passion is the first key to success, as passion shows that a leader cares. [rnrployees mnst
believe tlrat the issue at hand ntatters, and a leader who is passionate aboLrt er vision will be better
ahle to generate supporl fbr change. Passion can be shown in dif'ferent \\avs. hut a leader nrust
show that he or she has a vested interest in and cares about the outconre.
Within health care. the longer the issue is discussecl. the less liltely' it is that the proposed
cltanges within a bill will actually pass. The same might be saicl within thc r.vorkplace. When a
cltalt-ue is proposed. the longer people discuss the change the nrorc reasons people can flnd not to
chartge. All change comes with a level olrisk and speed is of irnportance. Implernentation of the
change l-nay take more tirne, br-rt the decision and steps to irrstitute the change slrould be r"r"rade
withor-rt delay.
Orre way to generate support fbr chernge is by getting ir-rpr"rt. A leader shoLrld attenrpt to
hring people together to have irnportant conversations and to nrake people f-eel that their input is
valr-rable. At the same time a leader needs to be able to make decisions necessary to fflove his or
her goals fbrward. President Obama came to ofJ-rce on a platfbrrn of change. with the
understanding that he would engage all members of Congress regardless of political party or
afllliation. and under the assumption that members would be open to working together.
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Urrfbrtunatell'. that was not the casc and as a result o1'Congressional leaders' inability'to work
togetlrer. Obarrra lost r,'alr-rable tintc arncl rnonrenturl on health care relbnn. I lowever'. oncc he
saw his initial plan w'as not working. he charrrged colrrse. Itecognizing this earlier in the process
when opponents were obviousll'stitlling the convelsation nray have rrade a difl'erence in
maintaining the desired rt"tontetttr-rr-r-r. The learrrirrg fl'om this is to continne to bring people
together but be able to identify a poirrt in time or a circunrstance in which a leader recognizes it
is tirne to move on regardless ol'input. Gctting input yet knowing when to nrove on will help
leaders of organizations ensLrre the change they seek is not stalled.
Similarly. both his arrd the adrlinistration's inability to initially rnanage Congress
imrlobilized President Olrartra. 'l'he same immobilization is ofien experienced when managing ern
organization. A leader slrclr-rlcl undcrstand the internal proccss and structure and enslll'e the right
people are in placc to help r-nilnrlge the process. In ternrs ol-process. President Obama's ,n,isiorr
tbr rcfbnl encolrraged a hipartisrln approach arrd hc hopcd that the plarr that was clelivered vuould
encornpass input ancl agrectnent fi"orrt all sides. I-le underestirlated the rcsistance he rvould
experience tiorrt opponents whose prin-rary concern was not so much about the issuc of liealth
care refbrm. but morc so with the politics of ensuring that President Obarla w'as del'eatecl.
Obama coltnted on reaching bipartisan agreement and spent considerable time nnd energy
fbcused on getting agreenrent fiom those in Congress tJrat had no intentior-rs of helping ge1 a bill
passed. A leader in this instance rlust evaluate what it will take to accomplish a goal" have
crucial conversations and make difficult decisions if necessary, such as lettir-rg go olthe r-reed filr
bipartisan sLrpport ilthat is what is reqr-rired.
Cetting the right people in place is the next lesson that applies whether rnanaging
Congress or an organization. President Obama learrred early on that within the political arena
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that the right person is evaluatecl be1'oncl-lust sl.,ills ur expcrience. A nunrber of President
Obatla's initial appointees nlay have hacl thc crcclcntials ancl sl<ills to nraneuver the systenl. but
actions in their personal lives called their integritl into clr"rcstior-r. Iror exarmple, Tonr Daschle
rvithdrew zrs the health and human services sccrctaru aficr it was discovered that he wers late in
payirrg his incorne taxes, anlong other allc'gatior-rs slrch as accepting gifts of travel and money.
Nancy Killdeer. who u,as set to becorne a new,l),crcatcd post olchielperfbrrlaltce officer. also
withdrew her name over unpaid taxes. Bill Richarclson w,as Obanta's tlrst choice fbr comrrrerce
secretary but withdrew during a grancl .iur),investi-rration into his potcr-rtially conupt relations
with a state contractor and financial contribr,rtor.
These instances caused pcople to qr-restirin Ol"ranrer ancl his adrninistration's credibility.
fbrced the adrrrinistration to add aclditiurral lar ers arrcl to the review process and closer scrutiny o1'
potential candidates, and elirrrinatccl pilterrtiallr -rtrci.ll appointees over lesser issues. While
Obama likely was not persotrall.v involvecl in l"rackgrouncl checks on arppointees. these types ot
issues r-tltinrately retlect on his leadcrship. FortLrnatelr lirr hinr. he had leaders on his side sr-rch
as Pelosi and Reid w.ho were able to nrarkc progrcss orr his behalf. Lcaders in any organization
mttst be aware what kind of leaclership or nri-uragcrnent is reqr-rired fbr the particular point in tinre.
be aware olany issues that rnight hinc'lcr the abilitl'to achieve the gozrl and rnake a hard decision
when time to move on.
Frotn the lesson of going public r.le nright clcrive that it is important fbr a leerder to serve
as the tace of the change being proposed ancl to cornmllnicate open and honestly with
constituents. The langLlage used shor-rld nrake it relevant. so they are able to understand their role
and how the change or issue impacts thenr. Maintair, ing a sense of purpose throughor-rt the
process can help tiame the change. and stories or specific examples can help clarity the reasons.
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As u,'as seen within health care" thcre atre lil<e11,n.ran)'clit-l'erent aucliences r,vho each u,ill rcrluire a
difterent approach orexplanation. A leader shoulcl bc ablc to clearll'conrrnunicate r.rsing
appropriate langr-rage fbr each auclience. At the sanre tirle. a leaderchor.,t.t creatc an image that
is appropriate to achieving the desirecl changc. A leader should evitluatc the envirn,.,,.,',.,',,- o,',0
tttrclerstar-rd what level of management is required. and nraintain a consistent irnagc thror-rghor.rt
the process.
Every organization faces budget challenges and zr learder needs to identify'how to make
sllre that tl-re cost of change does not become the reason nclt to chan-rre. A leader should
t-tnclerstand what it takes to work with f-rnance or accountirrg departnrents iind use lernguagc that
will help describe lrow the change can benefrt the organization 
- be it increasecl production.
reduction in cost. or irnprovement in enrployee or custotner satislirction.
-fhe 
best way to apply the lesson of learnirrg tcl losc f ur a lcader is to consider what
should happen afier tl-re fact should he or she not sr-rcceecl in creatirrg thc clesired changc. Farilure
provicles the opportr-rnity to learn ancl grow. and to rellne 1he approitch to achicve success the
next tinre around.
Finally, fiorn our lessons w.e learn about the in-rportancc o1'rentaining authentic. People
welnt a leaderthey can trust, one who instills asense olvision and pLlrpose. and one who believes
in and stays true to a cause. An authentic leader will be respected rcgardless olthe outcolne, a
powerfirl trait in the long rr-rn.
Conclusion
For President Obarna and those befbre him. the health care road has been long. the
journey complicated and the arguments endlessly debated. Regardless of political afTlliation or
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bcliel. everluatir-rg Presiderrt Oharla's lcadership in reccnt hcalth carc relunn provides lessons liir
lirture relilrnrcr"s ancl leaders o1'all levels striving to create changc.
Ilresidcnt Obarna's attetnpt at refbrnr wils successfirl fbr a nurnber ol'reasorrs. [iirst olall.
hc hail a visiort fbr refirrm thzrt he clearly con-rmunicated and which resonated rvith thc pr-rblic in
tleaninglirl rvay tlrat initially led to his election. Once in of1lce. he or-rtlirred his expectations fbr
delivering a plan within his f rrst year in of1lce. The saune public that voted Itirl into of-f icc
appeared to alter their opinion in terrns of what they thought his priorities slroulcl be but he
stayed true to the cause. as he believed that changing the cument systent was the only optiorr. At
the satnc time. he r,vats tlexible in ternrs of how the vision would heconrc realitv ancl nllou,ed it to
be shaped bl'those around hirn. In f-act. gathering input fionr all across the boarcl a licl'
reqr-rir-cnre ut in building the plarr.
Prcsidcr-rt Obarla had support. From driving lorces Nanc\, Pclosi and Ilan'1' Reicl. to ir
Dctlocraticallt'-c-ontrollcd Congress. to advisors such as Rhanr Enianucl anci Obarla's w'i1-c.
N4ichclle. an-tutrg others. Obarna surrounded himself rvith people uho nrit)'or lla),not ltave
initially'agreed with his plan but supported the president norretheless. Not without cluestion. but
respect lirlly so.
Presiclent Obama let go olarry f-ear of losing the next election. I)olitical lcaclers are ofien
so concerned about what nlay happen tomorrow that they lbrget w'hnt it is they are sllpposed
doing and r,thom they are sllpposed to be servingtodzry. President Obarna kncw hc rlight never
see a second term regardless of-health care and was not going to let sorlethirrg that l-rad not yet
happer-red deter hinr fiorn keeping reform on the agenda. He also knew that the bcst chance of
passing some level of refbrrn was with a Democratically-controlled Congress in plarce. There
was no telling what would happen afier nrid-term elections and it could be years befbre any
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signifrcant relbrnr could be attenlplcd again. Olranra always f-elt that the systenr was rrot
sustairrable as it existecl ernci uars cleternrined to create some kind of char-rge.
Presider-rt Obama's eflbrts were not perf-ect. of which he is well aware. I Ie has bc'err
criticized lor not shorving more ernotion. fbr not being more involved in the process ancl lirr
having a general naivety' about the political clirlate in Washington in thinking people would be
willing to r,vork togcthcr. 'l'he truth is that he was passionate about the issue - no leader would
attenrpt slrch a l'eat w,ithout it - but his leadership style does not generally include expressing
overt emotion. In addition. his plarr ancl approach called for others to lead. to be engaged and to
provide input into the conversi-rtiorr. I Ie dicl not want to become the tace of refbrrl. wlrich is to
say, he watntecl others witlrin the aclnrinistration and Congressional leaders to drive it. along with
input fionr those u'lro arc ser\/ed bl'ancl benefit frorn health care. When it was obvious that the
conversation was lreacling nou'hcrc. he coulcl liave w.alked away br-rt at the r-rrging ol'others Iikc
Pelosi. resolved his cornnritnrent ancl stel-rpecl into the role that was needed to see relbrrl through.
He shor.rld havc recosniz-crl the poinl at lr,'hich he needed to rethink his plan earlicr irr thc detratc.
but he eventually rccognized it. changed course and saw a version olhis vision beconre realitl'.
Another art:il vvhcrc Prcsident Obarna has been criticized but also praised n,as his
willingness to conrpr'orlise. f)hanra I'ne,uv the tlnal result wor-rld not be the perfbct plarn br-rt thzrt a
perf-ect plan r,vas ttot f'easibly possitrle. With so many vested interests, difJerences of opinion and
the broad spectrr-rm of issues that inllLrence healtl-r care, sorrre change was better thern no change.
Therefbre. a willingness to compronrise was required.
Finally. this time rvas dif't.erent because President Obarna had history on his side.
including the ability to learn tronr the last Democratic president's attempt at reform. Bill L'linton
was not able to accomplish health care refbrm during his tenure. Fortunately fbr Obama, he
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could revierv the last attc'r'npt and tarke concepts that u,'r-rrkcd u'ell sr-rch as thc idea of crcating a
lri-partisan grolrp to work to-r]ether or hosting torvr-r hall firrurls to gcnerate public interest. as rvell
as what did not work rvell, such as the importance ol'having the right leadership in place arrd the
art of compromise. Hewas not the flrst norw'ill he be the last president to attempt significant
refbrnl, but past eflbrts are perhaps the best way to crezrte a tbotprint fbr firtr-rre endeavors.
The ink fionr President Obama's signature rlra)' lre dr1'on the Pulicttt Prolection unt{
A//brduble (ur Act,but the work has_f ust begun and the firlure olhealth care relbnn remains to
be seen. Politics, economics. cultr"rre. systenls. r,alues and deep-seeded belief-s will continue to
challenge presidents, administrations and the process olrefbrm fbr,vears to conre. but. in this
instance, President Obar-na showed courageous leaclership. IIe saw,that the cost of health care
was weighing down both the econonric and physical healtlr o1'tlre natiorr. IIe created a vision
ar-rd stayed true to his word. He learrred fl'orrr past reftrrm atternpts and his own challenges. and
reflrred his approach along the wa,v in order to see it beconie realitt'. At the heart ol'health care
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